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ABSTRACT 
 
AN INVESTIGATION INTO  
PCAOB REPORTING DEFICIENCIES 
 
SEPTEMBER 2010 
JAMES SAMUEL WAINBERG, B.A., CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY 
M.S.A., UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by:  Professor Thomas Kida 
The PCAOB inspection reports for large audit firms are primarily anecdotal in 
nature, providing only a list of deficiencies found without any statistical context (e.g., the 
inspection sample size). This is problematic when trying to determine the extent of a 
firm’s audit weaknesses. However, simply adding statistical data to the reports, as 
currently provided in the PCAOB reports of small firms, may not solve the problem. 
Prior research suggests that statistical data are often ignored or underweighted when 
anecdotal data are present. This study investigates whether a bias for anecdotal data 
overwhelms the statistical data as currently presented in small firm reports, and whether 
any anecdotal bias can be overcome by possible decision aids. I first demonstrate that the 
anecdotal data presented in PCAOB reports can lead to incorrect perceptions of audit 
firms. I then find that the PCAOB’s practice of providing statistical context in small firm 
reports is ineffective; that is, users continue to focus on anecdotal data even in the 
presence of informative statistical data. Finally, I provide evidence to indicate that two 
easily implemented decision aids can successfully help incorporate statistical data into 
perceptions of audit firms, resulting in more informed audit engagement decisions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 created the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) to restore confidence in audited financial statements. The 
PCAOB has effectively replaced the AICPA’s practice of peer review, which had 
previously served as the industry’s measure of audit firm quality. Since 2003, the 
PCAOB has inspected the audit firms of SEC issuers and made public their inspection 
reports. As a result, PCAOB inspection reports have become the audit industry’s de facto 
independent measure of audit firm performance. 
The extent to which the PCAOB has been effective in providing useful 
information is under question. For example, the US Department of the Treasury’s 
Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (2008, 114) has warned that within the 
current PCAOB regulatory environment, there is “minimal publicly available information 
regarding indicators of audit quality at individual auditing firms,” and that “it is difficult 
to determine whether audit committees…have the tools that are useful in assessing audit 
quality that would contribute to making the initial auditor selection and subsequent 
auditor retention evaluation process more informed and meaningful.” So while the 
PCAOB has succeeded in providing independent reporting on firm audit performance, the 
“inspection reports still aren’t the scorecards of auditing expertise that corporations and 
investors had hoped for” (Whitehouse 2009, 1).  
Currently, the PCAOB issues two types of inspection reports depending on 
whether the audit firm is large or small, and these reports differ in terms of the 
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information provided.1 Reports for large firms are primarily anecdotal in nature and have 
been criticized for failing to provide any information that would help a user gauge the 
extent of the weaknesses found (BDO Seidman 2008). That is, the reports provide vivid 
descriptions of each audit deficiency identified, but are devoid of any statistical context 
for assessing the relative frequency of the deficiencies found (e.g., the number of audits 
inspected to find these deficiencies, the number of audits with no deficiencies found).2  
For example, if the PCAOB reports four deficiencies for a certain audit firm, users of that 
information do not know if ten audits were inspected or if only two had been inspected. 
As a result, information is not presented to adequately assess firm performance. 
The PCAOB reports for small firms provide basic contextual statistical 
information that would allow the reader to determine the relative frequency of audit 
deficiencies. These reports include the number of audits sampled and the number of 
audits where deficiencies were found, along with the listing of specific deficiencies. 
While an obvious solution would be to simply include this kind of scope information in 
large firm reports, that inclusion may not have the anticipated effect of providing 
sufficient context. Prior research in psychology, accounting and other fields suggests that 
we have an inherent bias for anecdotal data (Kida 2006; Green et al. 2000; Fagerlin et al. 
2005; de Wit et al. 2008; Kazoleas 1993; Wainberg et al. 2010). That is, statistical data 
are often ignored or underweighted when anecdotal data are present. This bias is 
especially likely to occur in small firm reports because the statistical data are embedded 
in the text preceding the deficiencies listed, increasing the likelihood that this information 
                                               
1
 Large firms are classified as having more than 100 public clients while small firms have 
100 or fewer clients. 
2
 Deficiencies refer to problems or weaknesses that are generally departures from GAAP 
or GAAS. 
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will be overlooked. As a result, even if statistical data were provided, as in small firm 
reports, it may be overshadowed by the more vivid anecdotes listed. 
The preference for anecdotal data is a robust and broad-based phenomenon and 
has been observed across a wide variety of decision making contexts. The most common 
reason given for this bias is that stories are generally more vivid and memorable than 
statistical forms of evidence (Nisbett and Borgida 1975; Hamill et al. 1980; Kazoleas 
1993; Baesler 1997). The vividness of stories can lead to an increase in the availability of 
its message, overwhelming the often more informative statistical data (de Wit et al. 2008; 
Block and Keller 1997). The question therefore arises: Does an anecdotal bias exist when 
users evaluate the information provided in PCAOB inspection reports? 
 
The PCAOB and the Regulatory Environment 
 The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) effectively brought to an 
end an era of self-regulation and oversight in the U.S. audit industry. Congress moved 
quickly to pass the Act as a response to the audit failures that shook the public markets at 
the turn of this century.3 Section 101 of the Act created the PCAOB to provide an 
independent oversight of the audit industry, making clear its directive “to oversee the 
audit of public companies that are subject to the securities laws, and related matters, in 
order to protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation 
of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports for companies” (SOX 2002, 750).  
                                               
3
 Notable failures include Enron, Tyco, Global Crossing, AOL, Adelphia, Cendant, 
Worldcom, Merck & Co., Kmart, IMClone Systems, Sunbeam, Qwest Communications, 
Xerox, & Waste Management. 
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 Prior to SOX, the U.S. audit industry had used the AICPA’s triennial peer reviews 
as its primary mechanism for quality control oversight. While self-regulation had its 
faults, peer review provided some measure of relative audit quality that could be used by 
audit committees, boards of directors, and shareholders (e.g., see Hilary and Lennox 
2005). With the passage of SOX, however, the peer review process was supplanted by 
PCAOB inspection reports. 
By replacing the AICPA peer review, the PCAOB inspection reports have 
effectively become the audit industry’s independent measure of auditor performance.  
While PCAOB disclaimers caution against using the reports as a balanced assessment of 
firm quality, they have done little to stop the financial press from publicizing the results 
with reputation-challenging headlines that chastise firms for poor performance.  For 
example, headlines stating “Audit Watchdog Report Raps Ernst, KPMG” (Wall Street 
Journal 2007), “PCAOB Cites PwC, Crowe for Shoddy Auditing,” (Compliance Week 
2008), or “Failing Grades for E&Y, KPMG” (CFO Magazine 2008) give the impression 
that these large firms are not providing high quality audit services. In addition, firms with 
relatively ‘clean’ inspection reports frequently use them as evidence to market the high 
quality of services they provide (Whitehouse 2009).  
Whether via sensationalized media accounts or from the reports themselves, 
negative publicity can have a serious effect on public perceptions of audit firm quality.  A 
firm’s reputation for quality is a fundamental determinant of its ability to attract and 
retain clients, and may affect the level of audit fees it charges (Chaney and Philipich 
2002). To defend their reputations, firms frequently issue strongly worded response 
letters claiming that the deficiencies listed in PCAOB reports are isolated instances and 
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disagreeing with the evaluations expressed. For example, BDO Seidman (2008, 1) 
complained that the “design of the draft Report does not provide a comprehensive 
description of the procedures that were performed… or other information that may 
provide additional context for understanding the nature or frequency of the findings.” 
Needless to say, audit firms view PCAOB inspection reports as potential threats to their 
reputations, and have noted and complained about the lack of statistical context. 
The PCAOB currently uses two different reporting styles for large and small 
firms. Large firm reports contain vivid, detailed descriptions of deficiencies found, 
without providing any statistical context for assessing the relative frequency of those 
deficiencies (e.g., the total number of audits the PCAOB inspected). This can have 
significant implications for perceptions of audit firm quality if users only rely on the 
number of weaknesses listed without taking any statistical context into account.  
For example, a firm receiving four deficiencies in its inspection report may have 
had as many as twelve audits inspected by the PCAOB (i.e., 0.25 deficiencies per audit 
inspected) or only one audit inspected (i.e., 4.0 deficiencies per audit). Focusing on 
anecdotal information alone, as large firm PCAOB inspection reports do, can lead to 
incorrect impressions of a firm. That is, without statistical information, users of the 
reports have no basis for assessing the relative frequency of the firm’s audit deficiencies.4 
                                               
4
 When deficiencies are listed and described without any reference to the number of 
audits inspected, it can negatively impact the perception of the firm. For example, in their 
2007 inspection reports, the PCAOB cited PwC with seven and Crowe Chizek and 
Company with five deficiencies in total, prompting the Compliance Week (2008) 
headline: “PCAOB Cites PwC, Crowe for Shoddy Auditing.” While finding five to seven 
deficiencies in a small number of audits inspected might indicate ‘shoddy auditing,’ 
finding this same number in a very large inspection sample of audits would probably not.  
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Providing statistical information in the reports of large firms, as is currently 
presented in small firm reports, would appear to be a simple solution to this problem of 
context deficiency.  However, this alone may not provide the comparative indicators of 
balanced reporting sought by the industry. Prior research suggests that statistical evidence 
is often ignored and/or underweighted in the presence of less informative anecdotal data 
(see, e.g., Kida 2006).  This is likely to be exacerbated by the fact that the statistical 
information provided in small firm reports is embedded in the boilerplate text preceding 
the anecdotal deficiencies, making it easily overlooked.5 As a result, even if statistics are 
provided, they may still be overlooked if attention is not drawn to them. This could have 
significant implications for assessing firm weaknesses. That is, firms that have the 
greatest absolute number of weaknesses reported, without taking into account the size of 
the sample taken, would be viewed more negatively than firms having fewer deficiencies, 
but with a higher ratio of deficiencies per audit. 
Stories vs. Statistics 
As humans, we appear to be predisposed to make inductive generalizations about 
the world by taking single accounts (i.e., stories, anecdotes, testimonials) and 
extrapolating to the population as a whole. Research in psychology, accounting, and other 
fields of behavioral research suggest that people often ignore the limitations imposed by 
sample size when making inductive generalizations. In particular, research suggests that 
we prefer stories over statistics (Kida 2006; Hamill et al. 1980; Borgida and Nisbett 
                                               
5
 For example, the following standard introduction was taken from a random small firm 
report: “The inspection procedures included a review of aspects of the Firm’s auditing of 
financial statements of six issuers….The deficiencies identified in three of the audits 
reviewed included deficiencies of such significance that it appeared to the inspection 
team that the Firm did not obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support its 
opinion on the issuers financial statements” (PCAOB Release no. 104-2008-097, 5). 
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1977; Zillmann 1999; Green et al. 2001; Fagerlin et al. 2005; de Wit et al. 2008; 
Wainberg et al. 2010). 
This preference for processing stories is believed to have originated as a result of 
our social and cognitive evolution (Landau 1984). Human knowledge and wisdom have 
historically been passed down from one generation to the next by stories or personal 
narratives. While story-telling dates back into human pre-history, statistical forms of data 
collection and presentation are a relatively new concept (Kida 2006). In fact, in 
evolutionary terms, we’ve only recently begun recording and storing data using external 
sources. As a result, humans do not appear to be ‘hard-wired’ to process statistics as they 
are stories. 
Studies across a number of fields have provided evidence for the existence of 
story, or anecdotal, preferences.  For example, Hamill et al. (1980) investigated the extent 
to which people make generalizations to a population based on a single anecdote, even 
after being warned that it was atypical of the population as a whole. They had participants 
watch a videotaped interview of a prison guard that appeared to be either humane or 
inhumane. Participants were either told that the person was typical, or atypical, of prison 
guards in general, and then asked to make assessments about the characteristics and 
intentions of prison guard populations. Results indicated that participants reacted to the 
characteristics of the single prison guard in the interview, and generalized what they 
observed to the population as whole with little attention given to the warning that the 
guard was atypical.  
In an accounting context, Wainberg et al. (2010) found that managers were more 
likely to make inferior capital investment decisions when provided with an anecdote that 
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conflicted with relevant statistical data. In that study, participants were given statistical 
data based upon reviews of hundreds of users of equipment under consideration and a 
single anecdote from a colleague expressing dissatisfaction with the statistically superior 
choice. Managers overwhelmingly ignored the statistical data in favor of the anecdote 
and elected to purchase equipment that was inferior in quality and more costly to operate. 
In a second experiment, they found that auditors conducting analytical review 
significantly underweighted the diagnostic value of statistical data in favor of the general 
implications provided by anecdotal data. 
In a medical study, de Wit et al. (2008) found that participants who received 
anecdotal evidence presented in the form of a personal written account about the risks 
and dangers associated with certain sexual behaviors were more likely to report an 
intention to change their risky behavior as compared to participants given only statistical 
evidence of risk. In addition, Borgida and Nisbett (1977) found that face-to-face 
testimonials were more persuasive than statistical data in a study designed to measure 
participant’s subsequent intention to take college courses, while Kazoleas (1993) found 
that participants exposed to anecdotal versus statistical forms of evidence were more 
likely to recall information and have attitude changes that were persistent over time. 
 Our preference for anecdotal over statistical data are also supported by 
transportation theory (Green et al. 2002), which proposes that a story’s ability to 
‘transport’ the listener into the narrative world can make the narrative experience seem 
more like a direct experience. Since direct experiences have a powerful effect on the 
formation of beliefs and attitudes, evidence capable of eliciting this type of processing 
can be formidably persuasive (Green and Brock, 2000; Fazio and Zanna 1981; Zillmann 
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and Brosius 2000). According to Green and Brock (2001), the greater the imagery 
invoked by a story, the greater the transportation of its reader and the more persuasive its 
message will be. Transportation theory is consistent with Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1973) availability heuristic, in that images that are more easily brought to mind give the 
impression of greater frequency of occurrence and plausibility.  
Absent statistical data, the PCAOB inspection reports for large audit firms are 
purely anecdotal, providing no context for assessing the frequency of weaknesses found. 
Moreover, including statistical data in the format currently used by the PCAOB for small 
firm reports may not be sufficient to counter the impact of the anecdotal data. Why would 
that occur? Prior research indicates that we preferentially attend to anecdotal data and 
that this bias is prevalent across a wide variety of decision making contexts. In addition, 
the statistics provided in the reports of small firms are buried in the boilerplate 
introduction used by the PCAOB, making them easy to overlook.  
 
Enhanced Statistical Presentation 
If participants ignore or underweight statistical data as now presented in small 
firm reports, the question arises as to what can be done to enhance attention to that 
information. Prior research has found that the use of statistical data can be increased by 
enhancing the vividness and presentation of the statistical information. For example, 
Fagerlin et al. (2005) investigated how anecdotal reasoning in a medical treatment 
decision could be reduced by the use of pictographs. Participants were provided with both 
anecdotal and statistical data relating to treatments for angina – balloon angioplasty and 
bypass surgery. The anecdotal data provided a description of former patient experiences 
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with each of the treatments, while statistical data indicated that the bypass surgery had a 
75% cure rate versus 50% for the balloon angioplasty. Participant treatment choices were 
consistent with anecdotal biases except when pictographs, drawing attention to the 
statistical information, were employed.6 
If the statistical data in small firm PCAOB reports is pallid by comparison to the 
vividness of anecdotal accounts of deficiencies noted, then elaboration and enhancement 
of the statistical data may be able to increase its salience. For example, a PCAOB report 
listing three deficiencies found at ten clients inspected could be elaborated on to highlight 
those areas where, in fact, no deficiencies were found (i.e., seven out of the ten clients 
had no deficiencies). In addition, enhancing the vividness of the statistical data could be 
achieved by placing it into a table along with the elaborations discussed, thereby 
increasing its chances of being attended to.  
 
Judgment Orientation 
Judgment Orientation refers to how a person will perceive a given task and the 
types of evidence they will attend to as a result of that orientation (Zukier and Pepitone 
1984). Epstein et al. (1992) propose that if a rational orientation is taken by decision 
makers, they will more likely engage their critical cognitive faculties.  For example, 
Dennis and Babrow (2005) gave participants either a ‘scientific’ or an ‘intuitive’ 
orientation prior to receiving both statistical and anecdotal evidence concerning a medical 
diagnosis. Participants in the scientific orientation condition were told that the study had 
been “sponsored by the ‘Center for Research in Scientific Thinking’ and that they should 
                                               
6
 The pictograph showed the number of people out of 100 expected to be cured by a 
given procedure by shading in that fraction of the figures provided in the graph.  
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make their judgment as would a scientist analyzing data.” In the intuitive condition, 
participants were told that the study was “sponsored by the ‘Center for Personal 
Decision-Making Studies’ and that they should make judgments based on sensitivity and 
general knowledge.” Participants in the ‘intuitive’ orientation condition showed a 
preferential assimilation and weighting of anecdotal information, whereas those in the 
‘scientific’ orientation condition were more attentive to the statistical data. 
In a capital budgeting context, Wainberg et al. (2010) had managers choose from 
among three capital investment options. Given both statistical and anecdotal data, 
managers overwhelmingly ignored the statistical data in favor of the anecdotal, and a 
significant reduction in anecdotal bias occurred when managers were given a judgment 
orientation. Some participants were given a definition of ‘scientific thinking’ and how 
science generally progresses through “the deliberate process of obtaining quantifiable 
evidence through observation and/or experimentation.” They were further instructed to 
make their judgments by analyzing the information in the way that a ‘scientist’ would, 
thereby promoting a rational orientation, as described by Epstein et al. (1992). This 
scientific judgment orientation decision aid proved very effective at focusing managers’ 
attention on the statistical data.  
As discussed previously, we do not appear be ‘hard-wired’ to attend to statistical 
data. If users of PCAOB inspection reports are biased towards processing anecdotal data, 
then simple enhancement and elaboration of statistical data may not be enough to 
overcome this bias. By introducing a judgment orientation as a de-biasing technique, 
along with enhanced statistical data, significantly greater attention to the statistical data 
may be achieved.  
12 
 
Overview of the Study 
In this study, I investigate whether the anecdotal data presented in PCAOB 
inspection reports for large firms overshadows the inclusion of statistical data, as 
presented in PCAOB reports of small firms. I also test the efficacy of two decision aids 
that the PCAOB could easily implement, which I designed to help incorporate statistical 
data into judgments. Prior decision making research suggests that anecdotal bias may be 
reduced by introducing visual enhancements to increase the vividness of statistical data, 
thereby increasing its chances of being assimilated into the decision (Fagerlin et al. 
2005). Research in psychology, accounting and other fields also suggests that a person’s 
judgment orientation, i.e., the approach taken to process certain forms of data, can impact 
the assimilation of statistical data in the decision making process (Zukier and Pepitone 
1984; Dennis and Babrow 2005; Wainberg et al. 2010). As a result, I investigate the 
efficacy of incorporating these two decision aids in PCAOB reports to counteract any 
anecdotal biases observed.  
The study asked managers and other professionals who qualify to serve on audit 
committees to make an auditor engagement decision after reviewing inspection reports 
for two audit firms. I examined five different conditions in a between-subjects design. In 
one condition, participants received inspection reports as now presented by the PCAOB 
for large audit firms. In another condition, participants evaluated the inspection reports as 
presented for small firms. A third condition received only statistical data, providing a 
benchmark for measuring the relative influence of that data alone. Finally, two conditions 
evaluated possible decision aids to help assimilate statistical data into the decision. One 
13 
 
condition tested the efficacy of visually enhancing the statistical data, while the other 
added a statistical judgment orientation. 
 
Preview of the Results 
My results indicate that the current reporting of anecdotal data by the PCAOB can 
lead to incorrect perceptions of audit firms. In addition, the statistical information 
provided by the PCAOB in small firm reports is ineffective. That is, users continue to 
focus on anecdotal data in the presence of statistical data, as now presented in small firm 
reports. Finally, I found that participants were more likely to incorporate the implications 
of statistical data when a vividness enhancement of the statistical data and a statistical 
judgment orientation were introduced. These findings suggest that anecdotal biases in the 
PCAOB inspection reports can be effectively mitigated by employing these easily 
implemented decision aids. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In this chapter I review the current literature relating to the PCAOB inspection 
reports and their relative importance in influencing audit committee engagement and 
retention decisions. I then review the studies which provide evidence for anecdotal biases 
that lead to either ignoring or underweighting of statistical data in decisions.  Finally, I 
review the handful of studies that have investigated decision aids for countering these 
anecdotal biases.  
The PCAOB and the Regulatory Environment 
 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was enacted as part 
of the sweeping regulatory reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Section 
101 of the Act created the PCAOB to provide an independent oversight of the audit 
industry, making clear its directive “to oversee the audit of public companies that are 
subject to the securities laws, and related matters, in order to protect the interests of 
investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and 
independent audit reports for companies” (SOX 2002, 750).  
Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley and the PCAOB, the audit industry had self-regulated by 
using the AICPA Peer Review process to report on audit firm quality. The Peer Review’s 
inherent lack of independence was blamed for not providing the vigorous oversight 
necessary for detecting and preventing numerous high profile accounting scandals in the 
late 1990’s and early 2000’s. One need only look to the massive failures of Enron, Tyco, 
Worldcom and others to understand how ineffective self-regulation had been. 
15 
 
However, even with all its faults, Peer Review did provide at least some measure of 
relative audit quality that could be used by audit committees, boards of directors, and 
shareholders (e.g., see Hilary and Lennox 2005). With the passage of SOX, the Peer 
Review process was effectively supplanted by PCAOB inspection reports. 
 PCAOB disclaimers warn against using their reports to infer audit quality.  
However, an unintended result of supplanting AICPA Peer Review is that PCAOB 
inspection reports have now effectively become the industry’s de facto independent 
measure of auditor performance.  PCAOB disclaimers are largely ignored by the financial 
press who often publicize the inspection report results, chastising the firms for poor audit 
performance. In addition, firms with relatively ‘clean’ inspection reports also ignore 
PCAOB disclaimers by using the reports as evidence of the high quality of services they 
provide (Whitehouse 2009). Whether the PCAOB likes it or not, the reports are being 
used as a measure of audit quality. 
 
PCAOB Inspection Reports 
The PCAOB currently issues two types of reports depending on whether a firm is 
designated as large or small.7 The information content of the reports differ in that large 
firm reports provide detailed descriptions of deficiencies found, without providing the 
total number of audits the PCAOB inspected. This can have significant implications for 
perceptions of audit firm quality as users may only rely on the number of weaknesses 
listed without taking any statistical context into account. 
                                               
7
 The PCAOB considers firms having more than 100 public clients to be large while all 
others are considered to be small. 
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In 2007, the U.S. Treasury established the Advisory Committee on the Auditing 
Profession to examine auditing industry concentration, its financial soundness, audit 
quality, and other topics (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2007). The committee’s 2008 
report warned that within the current PCAOB regulatory environment, indicators of audit 
quality at individual auditing firms were lacking and that it was difficult to determine 
whether audit committees had the necessary tools for assessing audit quality. That is, the 
committee noted a lack of publicly available information that would contribute to making 
the initial auditor selection and subsequent auditor retention evaluation process more 
informed and meaningful. While this assessment may not have been directed specifically 
at the PCAOB inspection reports themselves, it did reflect a general sentiment that the 
PCAOB inspection reports weren’t the scorecards of auditing expertise that the public 
had hoped for (Whitehouse 2009). 
The committee’s final report goes on to recommend that “the PCAOB, in 
consultation with auditors, investors , public companies, audit committees, boards of 
directors, academics, and others determine the feasibility of developing key indicators of 
audit quality and effectiveness and requiring auditing firms to publicly disclose these 
indicators” (VIII:15). They note that such indicators of audit quality are currently being 
disclosed in the UK and Europe since the inception of the Transparency reports as 
required by the EU’s Directive 8 (PCAOB SAG 2008).  
 
Professional Oversight Board 
 In the UK, the Professional Oversight Board (POB) provides regulatory oversight 
of the UK audit industry. The Audit Inspection Unit (AIU) is the arm of the POB that 
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monitors the audits of all listed and major public interest entities. The AIU is somewhat 
similar to the PCAOB in that it inspects the audit firms and makes public the results of 
those inspections. One noted difference is that, while the AIU reports on deficiencies 
uncovered in the inspection, it also provides an overall opinion on the audit practices of 
the firm being inspected (somewhat similar to the AICPA Peer Review reports), as well 
as provides underlying statistical information regarding the scope of the inspection (i.e., 
the number of a firm’s audits inspected by the AIU). As evidenced in their report on the 
2008 Standing Advisory Group meeting, the PCAOB is considering some of the 
reporting methods of the AIU for possible adoption. Adding statistics to the reports could 
be one possible way to improve them. 
  
Audit Firm Reaction 
 The PCAOB provides audit firms an opportunity to respond to the content of their 
inspection report prior to its publishing in the form of response letters. The firm 
responses are then attached to the back of the publicly available inspection report itself. 
The response letters provide evidence that some firms are aware of the lack of statistical 
context in the PCAOB inspection reports and its potential implications. For example, 
BDO Seidman (2008, 1) has complained numerous times in their response letters that the 
“design of the draft Report does not provide a comprehensive description of the 
procedures that were performed… or other information that may provide additional 
context for understanding the nature or frequency of the findings.” Needless to say, audit 
firms view PCAOB inspection reports as potential threats to their reputations, and have 
noted and complained about the lack of statistical context. However, as discussed in the 
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next section, adding statistical data alone may not solve the problem of lack of statistical 
context. 
Stories vs. Statistics 
 There is a growing body of literature in psychology, communications, medical 
decision making, and more recently accounting, suggesting that people are generally 
better at assimilating stories than they are statistics (Kida 2006; Zillmann 1999; Hamill et 
al. 1980; Borgida and Nisbett 1977; Green et al. 2001; Fagerlin et al. 2005; deWit et al. 
2008; Kazoleas 1993). That is, we as humans appear to be ‘hard-wired’ to making 
inductive generalizations about the world by taking single accounts (i.e. stories, 
anecdotes, testimonials) and extrapolating these to the population as a whole. 
 Landau (1984) ascribes this predilection for processing stories as being rooted in 
our social and cognitive evolution. She argues that scientists, in general, have failed to 
recognize the extent to which narrative structures shape and define their thinking and 
communication of ideas. Story-telling is ubiquitous to human culture and narrative 
traditions can be traced back to the very root of human history. Traditional forms of 
human knowledge and wisdom have typically been passed down from one generation to 
the next by way of narrative, or other story-telling vehicle.  Kida (2006) explains that the 
consequence of this is an inherent human “penchant to pay close attention to information 
that comes to us in the form of a story or personal account.”   
 Hamill, Wilson, and Nisbett (1980) investigated the extent to which people make 
inductive generalizations to a population based on a single anecdote, even after being 
warned that it was atypical of the population as a whole. They had 127 participants read a 
description of an irresponsible woman who had been on welfare for many years. 
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Participants in one condition were told that this was a typical representation of a welfare 
recipient and provided statistics to corroborate this claim.  The statistics reported that the 
average length of stay for a welfare recipient was 15 yrs and that 90% were still on the 
rolls after eight years. 
 Participants in a second condition were warned that the depiction of the 
irresponsible woman was not typical and were provided statistical data that was more 
positive and conflicted with that depiction. These statistics disconfirmed the exemplar 
and reported that the average stay on welfare was two years and that 90% were off the 
rolls by four years. A control condition provided a baseline for a priori beliefs relating to 
the subject matter. After reviewing the materials, participants were asked to answer seven 
Likert-type scale questions meant to assess their attitudes toward welfare recipients. Their 
results indicated that participants in the atypical condition failed to assimilate the more 
positive statistical information into their judgments as inferences made to the general 
population of welfare recipients failed to differ between the two experimental conditions 
(t = 0.44,  p > 0.25). Participants in the control condition held a more favorable view of 
welfare participants than the atypical condition (t = 2.50, p < 0.05), even though their 
uninformed beliefs were generally more negative.8  
 In a second experiment, Hamill et al. (1980) had 147 participants watch a 
videotaped interview of a prison guard that appeared to be either humane or inhumane. 
Participants in the first two conditions were either told that the interview was typical or 
                                               
8
 Participants in the control condition guessed that the average length of stay on welfare 
was 10 years and that the required length of time required to remove 90% of recipients 
from the rolls was 21 yrs. 
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atypical of prison guards in general.9 Participants in a control condition were not given 
any information as to the typicality of the representation.  After watching the video 
interview, participants were asked four questions relating to the dependent measure.  
Their results indicated that they were markedly influenced by the characteristic of the 
guard in the video. The humaneness of the guard accounted for 26.4% (F = 38.43, 
p<0.001) of the total variance while the sampling information accounting for only 1.2% 
of the variance (F < 1, ns).10 
 Borgida and Nisbett (1977) examined the effect that testimonials can have on 
people’s choices. In their study, undergraduate student participants were asked to indicate 
their intention to take courses after being exposed to either statistical data (representing 
summarized course evaluations on a five-point scale from a larger student body) or face-
to-face testimonials (in the form of a panel of upper level students), where the course was 
rated by two or three students on the panel using the same five-point scale. Their results 
suggest that the vividness of the face-to-face testimonials were a more powerful influence 
on students’ subsequent intention to take courses than the summary statistical data.  
 In a medical treatment decision task, Fagerlin, Wang and Ubel (2005) asked 
participants to choose between two treatments for angina - balloon angioplasty and 
bypass surgery.  Participants were provided with a brief description of the effects of 
angina (e.g., tightness in chest and difficulty performing everyday chores), along with 
details about the two types of treatment available.  Statistical data relating to the success 
rate of each type of treatment were provided. In addition to the statistical data, 
                                               
9
 The prison guard in this conditions was described as either being “one of the best” 
(humane) or “one of the worst” (inhumane). 
10
 The authors do not provide exact F or p values for that analysis. 
21 
 
testimonials were provided that were either consistent or inconsistent with the statistical 
information (i.e., the patient testimonials described how the procedure had helped or 
didn’t help their condition). Their results suggest that the testimonials had a significant 
influence on a participant’s preference for bypass surgery over balloon angioplasty, with 
41% choosing bypass when the anecdotes were representative of the statistics, versus 
only 20% when the testimonials were not (χ2 = 14.4, p < 0.001). 
 In another recent medical study, de Wit, Das and Vet (2008) examined whether 
objective statistical information or personal testimonial was more effective in the 
transmission and acceptance of a health risk communication. The majority of the 118 
participants in the study identified themselves as homosexual (86.4%) and warranted 
inclusion in the study as an at-risk population for HBV (Hepatitis-B). Participants 
provided with statistical information were told that the number of chronic HBV infections 
had increased by 80% in recent years and that 30% of those infected were homosexual 
men who comprise only approximately 5% of the general population (indicating the 
highest risk for that group). Participants in the narrative condition were provided with a 
personal testimonial of a homosexual male who had resisted vaccination for HBV and 
subsequently become infected. Each condition ended with a message stating that 
vaccination was effective in providing long-term protection from HBV. Their results 
indicate that both the perceived risk of infection as well as an intention to obtain 
vaccination was highest among men who received the narrative vs. statistical data.11  
                                               
11
 While significant overall ANOVA statistics are provided by the authors (two control 
groups were included in the study), specific t-test results are not provided and are only 
mentioned in the text as being significant.  
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 In a recent working paper, Wainberg, Kida and Smith (2010) conducted two 
experiments in two different accounting contexts (i.e., managerial accounting and 
auditing) to investigate whether accounting decision makers were unduly influenced by 
anecdotal data in the presence of superior, and contradictory, statistical data. In their first 
experiment, they had 92 practicing managers and other individuals with significant 
business experience engage in a capital budgeting investment task. Participants were 
asked to make an investment choice between three machines for a manufacturing 
production line. All were provided with statistical data relating to each machine’s 
reliability rating and economic cost of operation. They were informed that these statistics 
were from a trusted source and represented hundreds of observation points collected from 
managers in the industry having had first-hand experience with the equipment.  
Participants receiving an anecdote read about a single bad experience with the top-rated 
choice. They were informed that this anecdotal experience had been captured in the 
aggregated statistical measure (thereby rendering it irrelevant).  Participants exposed to 
the anecdote were more likely to make suboptimal investment choices (i.e., 58% of 
participants shunned the superior choice and elected to purchase equipment that was of 
inferior quality and more costly to operate) when compared to participants not exposed to 
the anecdote, where only 4% failed to choose the optimal investment (χ2 = 16.285, p < 
0.001).  
 In their second experiment, Wainberg et al. (2010) tested for the existence of 
anecdotal biases in an audit setting. Fifty-five entry-level auditors were provided with 
hypothetical audit case materials and asked to perform an analytical review and make a 
resource allocation decision based on that review. The financial statements (i.e., 
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statistical data) provided to the auditors indicated that the accrued warranty liability and 
related expense accounts had experienced a significant, yet unexplained, income-
increasing fluctuation when compared to the previous year.  
 In one condition, auditors were provided with two anecdotes in addition to the 
statistics. The anecdotes were designed to direct attention away from the account with the 
large fluctuation (i.e., accrued warranty liability) and toward the account that had 
relatively little fluctuation (i.e., accrued compensation liability). The first anecdote 
represented a financial news story that involved fraud at another company where 
executives had understated accrued compensation liability and expenses in order to meet 
analyst forecasts. The second anecdote, provided in the form of a consumer report article, 
provided a glowing assessment of the company’s product reliability (which had remained 
unchanged for the last five years). This second anecdote was designed to provide an 
unwarranted level of comfort with the precipitous drop in expenses over the period. 
Consistent with prior research, their results indicated that auditors were unduly impressed 
by the anecdotal data and significantly underweighted the diagnostic value of the 
statistical data, as evidenced by their allocation of audit resources.  
 
Summary 
 Overall, there is a growing body of literature in psychology, communications, 
medical decision making, and accounting that point to the existence and prevalence of 
anecdotal biases across wide range of decision making tasks. The PCAOB inspection 
reports for large firms are primarily anecdotal in nature, providing vividly detailed 
descriptions of deficiencies uncovered by the inspection teams without any statistical 
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context. However, including statistical data in the reports may not solve this problem. 
Based on the research previously discussed, users of the reports are likely to ignore or 
underweight those statistics, focusing primarily on the sheer number of anecdotes 
reported without taking into account the relative frequency with which they occur.  
While many studies have successfully demonstrated the stories vs. statistics 
phenomenon, the underlying psychological mechanism causing our preference for stories 
over statistics is an open question. As mentioned previously, this preference could be 
attributed to our social and cognitive evolution. That is, our predisposition for the 
narrative format may be a result of our ancestral heritage of passing along information in 
that form. In addition, dual process theories of reasoning and transportation theory have 
been advanced as possible explanations as well. These are discussed in the following 
section. 
Dual Process-Theories of Reasoning 
A number of recent studies have suggested the use of dual process theories of 
reasoning and transportation theory as descriptive models to provide a theoretical 
explanation for these observed effects (Hinyard and Kreuter 2007; Berger 2007; Green 
and Brock 2000; Green et al. 2002; Knowles and Linn 2004; Limon and Kazoleas 2004). 
The dual process theory of reasoning refers to a substantial and growing body of 
literature in psychology proposing that individuals use two distinct cognitive systems to 
process information. Philosophers and psychologists have long debated the existence of 
these dual systems with references being made to it dating back into antiquity (Sloman 
1996; Epstein 1994; Evans 2003).  The duality of reasoning expressed in these theories 
can be commonly observed in everyday life and are often expressed in what laymen 
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would term ‘head’ vs. ‘heart’ decision choices. 12  Brain imaging studies using fMRI 
technology support the existence of these separate systems with different areas of the 
brain being active in the performance of certain types of cognitive reasoning tasks (Goel 
2003; Evans 2003). If differing types or forms of evidentiary matter have the potential to 
differentially engage these two systems of processing, then biased decision choices could 
occur. 
Stanovich and West (2000) provide a comprehensive review of these dual process 
theories, applying the generic labels of System 1 and System 2 in place of the more 
descriptive terms often used. System 1 refers to cognition that can be characterized as 
intuitive, rapid, and effortless, consistent with the constructs of automaticity and heuristic 
processing. System 2 refers to the deliberative processing of analytical intelligence. 
System 2 is often described as slower, more controlled, rule-based form of cognitive 
processing.  
According to the dual process model, System 1 and System 2, though separate, 
operate jointly to affect decision choices with task variables influencing the degree to 
which a decision maker will rely on each of those system’s outputs. The effect of each 
system on a given decision choice will depend largely on where the decision maker 
stands on that System 1 – System 2 processing continuum (i.e., the level of System 2 
engagement). 
                                               
12
 The terms most often used in psychology to express this cognitive duality include 
intuitive vs. analytical, implicit vs. explicit, experiential vs. rational, heuristic vs. 
analytic, tacit vs. explicit, and cognitive vs. experiential. While many of the technical 
properties of these dual-process systems do not match precisely, their underlying 
constructs bear familiar resemblances (Stanovich and West 2000). 
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 Epstein et.al., (1992) propose that stories (i.e., narratives, anecdotes) are 
appealing to System1 because they tend to be emotionally engaging and represent events 
and situations that are quite similar to those experienced in real life, whereas statistical 
data is least often integrated in our daily lives. Being rich in anecdotal detail, the PCAOB 
inspection reports for large firms may appeal to, or engage more of, System 1 versus 
System 2 - type processing.  
 
Transportation Theory 
 Transportation theory (Green and Brock 2000) provides yet another possible 
explanation for the existence of these narrative or anecdotal biases. Transportation theory 
posits that a powerfully persuasive factor of the narrative, or story, format is its ability to 
‘transport’ the reader into another frame of reference.  
 Transportation theory holds that a story’s ability to ‘transport’ an individual into 
the narration can significantly reduce counterarguments  which can lead to a greater 
acceptance of an argument’s message.  For example, Limon and Kazoleas (2004) find 
that participants exposed to messages supported by anecdotes generated fewer 
counterarguments and produced a lower number of cognitive responses than those 
exposed to messages supported by statistics only. 
Transportation theory also posits that ‘transportation’ into the narrative can have 
the effect of making the message seem like a direct experience. Since direct experiences 
can have a powerful effect on the formation of attitudes and beliefs, evidence capable of 
eliciting that type of processing can be formidably persuasive (Fazio and Zanna 1981; 
Zillman and Brosius 2000).  
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Decision Aids 
 A small number of decision aids have been examined for de-biasing decision 
maker judgments where anecdotal biases have been found. Three decision aids in 
particular have proven successful in this regard – judgment orientation, enhanced 
statistical presentation, and counterargument. The present study investigates the efficacy 
of the first two decision aids in de-biasing judgments made using anecdote-laden PCAOB 
inspection reports. The literature concerning the two decision aids examined are 
discussed. 
 
Judgment Orientation 
 Judgment orientation has been used as a de-biasing aid in a handful of studies. 
Judgment orientation typically refers to how the contextual features of a decision can 
influence a decision maker’s conception of a task, the kinds of evidence considered, and 
the specific cognitive strategies employed (Zukier 1984; Zukier and Pepitone 1984). That 
is, the relative weights placed on differing types of information in a decision task can be 
largely defined by the orientation taken by the decision maker. As a consequence, Zukier 
and Pepitone (1984) argue that information considered important in one orientation may 
be ignored or underweighted in another. 
 Zukier and Pepitone (1984) examined the effect of taking a ‘scientific’ or 
‘clinical’ orientation on base rate utilization in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) classic 
engineer-lawyer problem. In that Kahneman and Tversky problem, participants were told 
that an individual had been randomly selected from a pool of 100 professionals – either 
70 lawyers and 30 engineers or 30 lawyers and 70 engineers. The individual is described 
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as being conservative, careful, and interested in math puzzles. While this description is 
made to purposefully sound like an engineer, thereby invoking the representativeness 
heuristic, it does not in any way preclude the individual from being a lawyer. Participants 
in these studies invariably fail to appropriately incorporate the statistical information in 
their likelihood assessments. In fact, even when an entirely neutral description is 
provided (i.e., the individual is of high ability, well respected), participant likelihood 
judgments center around 0.5, reflecting an overweighting of the uncertain neutral 
description and an underweighting of the statistical data.  
 In the Zukier and Pepitone (1984) study, participants were provided with a 
judgment orientation prior to their exposure to Kahneman and Tversky’s problem. 
Participants given a ‘scientific’ orientation were told that the study had been sponsored 
by the ‘Center for Research in Scientific Thinking’ and that they were examining how 
much people will use scientific thinking in making decisions when provided with only a 
few pieces of information.  They were further instructed to make their judgment as if they 
were scientists analyzing the data. Conversely, participants given a ‘clinical’ orientation 
were told that the study had been sponsored by the ‘Center for Job Counselor Training’ 
and told to call on their general knowledge, sensitivity, and empathy in making their 
assessment. The results indicated that participants provided with a ‘scientific’ orientation 
were more likely to incorporate the statistical data into their judgments. 
 In a more recent study of judgment orientation, Dennis and Babrow (2005) 
extended the judgment orientation literature into a medical decision task where 
participants were asked to assess the likelihood that a patient had an illness, rather than 
membership to a professional group. Their results were largely consistent with Zukier 
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and Pepitone (1984), whereas a ‘scientific’ judgment orientation was successful in 
drawing attention to the statistical data while a ‘narrative’ orientation had participants 
more focused on qualitative information. 
 Wainberg et al. (2010) examined whether or not a ‘scientific’ judgment 
orientation might help de-bias a manager’s capital budgeting decisions. They tested two 
versions of their ‘scientific’ orientation; a stronger and weaker version. In both 
orientation conditions, participants were told prior to reading the case materials that the 
study had been sponsored by “The Center for Scientific Thinking in Management,” and 
they were provided with a short explanation of what “scientific thinking” entailed (i.e., “a 
scientific thinker is one who very carefully considers the quality of each piece of 
information”).  In the stronger orientation condition, this description of scientific thinking 
was enhanced with an additional description of how science progresses (i.e., “Progress in 
science is generally achieved via the deliberate process of obtaining quantifiable data 
through observation and/or experimentation”). Participants in both orientation conditions 
were told to analyzing the information in the way that a scientist would and then to ‘think 
like a scientist’ just prior to making their decision.  
 Their results indicated that the ‘scientific’ orientation was successful in directing 
attention to the statistical data. In the weaker orientation condition, 52 percent of 
participants made the optimal decision (i.e., the statistically superior choice) as compared 
to only 42 percent of participants in the non-orientation condition (χ2 = 3.969, p = 0.069). 
In addition, when the scientific judgment orientation manipulation was made stronger, 78 
percent of the participants chose the statistically superior choice, which was significantly 
more than the participants in both the non-orientation (χ2 = 5.784, p = 0.027) and the 
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weaker ‘scientific’ orientation condition (χ2 = 5.187, p = 0.038) conditions. While the 
enhanced intervention did not completely eliminate the anecdotal bias, the results indicate 
that it was highly effective in reducing that bias. 
 As evidenced by the studies previously described, a judgment orientation can be 
helpful for focusing attention on specific elements of a decision.  
 
Enhanced Statistical Presentation 
 Prior research by Fagerlin, Wang, and Ubel (2005) has found that the use of 
statistical data can also be increased by enhancing the vividness and presentation of the 
statistical information. Asking whether a picture was worth a thousand statistics, Fagerlin 
et al. (2005) replicated an earlier study that found an anecdotal bias in a medical decision 
and then utilized pictographs in order to enhance the delivery of statistical information. 
As previously described here in this review, the authors had asked participants to choose 
between two treatments for angina - balloon angioplasty and bypass surgery.  Their 
results suggested that anecdotal data had a significant influence on participant’s 
preference for bypass surgery over balloon angioplasty, with 41% choosing bypass when 
the anecdotes were representative of the statistics, versus only 20% when the anecdotes 
were not (χ2 = 14.4, p < 0.001). The authors found that decisions were considerably de-
biased when a pictograph was introduced (see Figure 2.1) indicating the various success 
rates using the two treatments. 
The pictograph in Figure 2.1 graphically illustrates that the success rate for curing 
angina is 50% using balloon angioplasty and 75% when bypass surgery is chosen. In their 
study, participants receiving the pictographic representation of the statistical data were 
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more likely to choose bypass surgery than participants receiving non-enhanced statistical 
information (40% vs. 27%, χ2 = 6.44, p < 0.001). 
 
FIGURE 2.1 
Pictograph of Statistical Data 
 
 In an earlier medical focus study, Schapira, Nattinger and McHorney (2001) 
found that participants responded best to frequency graphics that use human figures to 
highlight the risk of breast cancer. In the graphical representation of breast cancer risk 
presented in Figure 2.2, human figures add contextual meaning to the statistical 
information by illustrating a nine percent lifetime risk of contracting cancer.  Schapira et 
al.’s (2001) focus group found this format to be easier to identify and more 
understandable than other forms of statistical representation. 
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FIGURE 2.2 
Graphical Representation of Statistical Risk 
 
 Overall, the research suggests that vividness enhancements can be used to 
successfully improve the chances that statistical data are assimilated into judgments being 
made.  
Summary 
The PCAOB inspection reports are an important tool for reporting on the audit 
quality of both large and small firms. While preliminary results have been mixed as to 
whether the market uses these reports to make auditor engagement and retention 
decisions, the report findings are being used both in the general press, and by the 
accounting firms themselves. The reports for large firms contain only anecdotal lists of 
deficiencies found without any statistical context for understanding the magnitude of the 
deficiencies uncovered. This lack of statistical context can lead to incorrect perceptions 
of audit firm quality. Simply providing statistics, as found in the reports for small firms, 
may not provide a solution to this problem. As discussed in this section, there is a 
considerable amount of research indicating that anecdotal biases are likely to overwhelm 
the inclusion of statistical information.  However, prior research has found that decision 
aids, such as judgment orientation and vividness enhancement, can be successfully 
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employed to mitigate this bias by focusing attention away from the anecdotal data and 
onto statistical data.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 The primary purpose of this study is to examine whether the lack of statistical 
context in large firm reports can lead to incorrect perceptions of audit firms and whether 
the inclusion of statistical context will be overshadowed by the anecdotal deficiencies 
listed in the reports as the result of an anecdotal bias.  The experiment concerned having 
participants make an audit engagement decision between two firms after reviewing 
PCAOB-likened inspection reports for each firm.  
 The study manipulated the number of deficiencies reported in each inspection 
report so that one firm would be preferable over the other when no statistical context was 
provided. That is, preference would naturally favor the firm with the fewest deficiencies, 
ceteris paribus. The addition of statistical data was intended to switch preference from 
the firm with the fewest number of deficiencies in total to the firm with the fewest scaled 
deficiencies per audit. That is, consideration of the statistical implications would favor the 
firm having the highest number of deficiencies in total, but with the lowest percentage of 
deficiencies per audit inspected, ceteris paribus. 
 Finally, the experiment also investigated the efficacy of using two decision aids, 
judgment orientation and a vividness enhancement, for overcoming any anecdotal biases 
identified. 
Hypotheses 
The PCAOB currently uses two different reporting styles for large and small 
firms. Large firm reports contain vivid, detailed descriptions of deficiencies found, 
without providing any statistical context for assessing the relative frequency of those 
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deficiencies (e.g., the total number of audits the PCAOB inspected). This can have 
significant implications for perceptions of audit firm quality if users only rely on the 
number of weaknesses listed without taking any statistical context into account.  
To determine whether this is a potential problem, I reviewed all of the PCAOB 
inspection reports for small firms between August 2004 and May 2009, for which the 
PCAOB does provide information on the number of audits inspected. My results, 
reported in Table 3.1, illustrate the potential problem.13  As can be seen, the range of 
audits inspected for each number of deficiencies found can vary widely. For example, a 
firm receiving four deficiencies in its inspection report may have had as many as thirteen 
audits inspected by the PCAOB (i.e., 0.31 deficiencies per audit inspected) or as few as 
one audit inspected (i.e., 4.0 deficiencies per audit). Focusing on anecdotal information 
alone (as large firm PCAOB inspection reports do) can potentially lead to incorrect 
impressions of a firm. That is, without statistical information, users of the reports have no 
basis for assessing the relative frequency of the firm’s audit deficiencies. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
It would appear that a simple solution to the problem of context deficiency would 
be to provide statistical information in the reports of large firms, as is currently presented 
in small firm reports.  However, this alone may not solve the problem.  As discussed in 
the literature review section of this paper, prior research suggests that statistical evidence 
is often ignored and/or underweighted in the presence of less informative anecdotal data.  
In addition, anecdotal biases are likely to be exacerbated by the fact that the statistical 
                                               
13
 The table only includes inspection reports for small firms because no information about 
the number of audits inspected is provided in the reports of large firms. 
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information provided in small firm reports is embedded in the boilerplate text preceding 
the anecdotal deficiencies, making it easily overlooked.14 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics from 793 PCAOB Small Firm Inspection Reports* 
 
Range of Audits 
Inspected 
Number of 
Deficiencies per Audit 
Inspected 
Number of 
Deficiencies Min Max Min Max 
0 1 16 n/a n/a 
1 1 10 0.10 1.00 
2 1 11 0.18 2.00 
3 1 10 0.30 3.00 
4 1 13 0.31 4.00 
5 2 9 0.56 2.50 
6 2 9 0.67 3.00 
7 2 8 0.88 3.50 
8 1 13 0.62 8.00 
9 2 12 0.75 4.50 
10 4 14 0.71 2.50 
11 or more** 3 9 1.33 3.67 
 
* I collected data from all available PCAOB inspection reports from August 2004 through May 
2009. I only present the data from small firm reports because no scope information is available 
for large firms. The number of deficiencies found refers to the total number of deficiencies 
reported in the inspection report of a given firm. The range of audits inspected provides the scope 
of the inspection team’s audit, which can vary widely. For example, a firm having four 
deficiencies may have had as many as thirteen, or as few as one, audit inspected. The number of 
deficiencies per audit is the number of deficiencies divided by the number of audits inspected. 
** 99% of the inspection reports of small firms have 10 or fewer deficiencies. 
 
 
                                               
14
 For example, the following standard introduction was taken from a random small firm 
report: “The inspection procedures included a review of aspects of the Firm’s auditing of 
financial statements of six issuers….The deficiencies identified in three of the audits 
reviewed included deficiencies of such significance that it appeared to the inspection 
team that the Firm did not obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support its 
opinion on the issuers financial statements” (PCAOB Release no. 104-2008-097, 5). 
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As a result, the statistics may still be overlooked if attention is not drawn to them. This 
could have significant implications for assessing firm weaknesses, possibly leading to 
misperceptions of firm audit quality. That is, firms that have the greatest absolute number 
of weaknesses reported, without taking into account the size of the sample taken, could 
be viewed more negatively than firms having fewer deficiencies, but with a higher ratio 
of deficiencies per audit. 
 Given the preceding discussion and results of prior research, I test the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: Participants given inspection reports containing anecdotal lists of 
deficiencies and statistical data, as currently presented in PCAOB 
reports of small firms, will make decisions consistent with having 
ignored, or underweighted, the implications of the statistical data, 
resulting in decisions that are no different from those using inspection 
reports that just list anecdotal data, as presented in large firm reports. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 As previously discussed, prior research has found that the use of statistical data 
can be increased by enhancing the vividness and presentation of the statistical 
information.  If the presentation of statistical data in PCAOB small firm reports are pallid 
when compared to the vividness of anecdotal accounts of deficiencies noted, then 
elaboration and enhancement of the statistical data may be able to increase its salience. 
For example, a PCAOB report listing four deficiencies found at ten clients inspected 
could be elaborated on to highlight those areas where, in fact, no deficiencies were found 
(i.e., six out of the ten clients had no deficiencies). Also, enhancing the vividness of the 
statistical data could be achieved by placing it into a table along with the elaborations 
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discussed, thereby increasing its chances of being attended to. As a result, I test the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: Participants given inspection reports containing an anecdotal list of 
deficiencies and enhanced statistical data will make decisions consistent 
with a greater utilization of statistical data than participants receiving an 
anecdotal list of deficiencies only, as presented in PCAOB reports of large 
firms, and an anecdotal list of deficiencies and statistical data, as 
presented in PCAOB reports of small firms. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
 As discussed previously, we do not appear be ‘hard-wired’ to attend to statistical 
data. If users of PCAOB inspection reports are biased towards processing anecdotal data, 
then an enhancement and elaboration of the statistical data, as theorized in Hypothesis 2, 
may not be enough to overcome this bias. I propose introducing a judgment orientation as 
a debiasing technique, in addition to the enhanced statistical data. As a result, I test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Participants given a judgment orientation promoting attention to 
statistical data, in addition to the anecdotal list of deficiencies and 
enhanced statistical data, will make decisions consistent with a greater 
utilization of statistical data than participants receiving an anecdotal 
list of deficiencies only, as presented in PCAOB reports of large firms, 
an anecdotal list of deficiencies and statistical data, as presented in 
PCAOB reports of small firms, and anecdotal lists of deficiencies and 
enhanced statistical data. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 207 managers and other professionals who qualify to serve on 
audit committees. Responses were obtained while they attended a professional 
management training program. The participants included individuals from upper level 
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management (e.g., corporate director, president, chief operating officer), middle level 
management (e.g., operations manager, product manager, senior finance manager), and 
others with significant professional experience (e.g., controller, financial analyst, senior 
internal auditor). On average, participants had nine years of business experience.15  The 
participants’ backgrounds qualify them to serve on boards of directors and audit 
committees of many companies across a range of industries, and therefore influence 
auditor selection and retention decisions (SEC 2003; Hoitash et al. 2009; Kesner 1988).16 
 
Overview of the Study 
The instrument was administered online using Qualtrics® research software. 
Participants were asked to assume the role of an audit committee member and to make a 
hiring decision between two audit firms that were being considered to perform the 
company’s year-end audit. The two firms under consideration were described as being 
identical with respect to size and historical reputation. Participants were told that they had 
obtained the publicly available annual inspection reports from the (PCAOB-likened) 
Federal Public Auditor Regulatory Board (FPARB) whose job it was to “audit the 
                                               
15
 Fiolleau et al. (2009) found that managers influence auditor selection decisions. Of our 
207 participants, 152 were experienced managers. I ran all of the analyses using only 
managers and found similar results that yielded the same conclusions as those reported 
with all participants included (please see the additional analyses section for a more 
complete analysis of that sub-group’s responses). In addition, I found no significant 
effects due to the level of business experience.   
16
 The SEC (2003) requires that only one member of the audit committee have financial 
expertise, which the SEC broadly defines as having an understanding of financial 
reporting and internal controls, but explicitly not necessarily requiring financial or 
supervisory experience (i.e., financial experts need not be CEOs, CFOs, CPAs, etc.). The 
remaining members of the audit committee need not even meet the ‘understanding’ 
requirement. In fact, Hoitash et al. (2009) report that a full 79% of audit committee 
members, in their sample of public companies, were not financial accounting experts. 
Consistent with this finding, we conducted a review of audit committees of public 
companies and found a wide range of professional backgrounds. For example, audit 
committee members include managers, lawyers, physicians, engineers and other 
professionals across a variety of industries. 
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auditors.”17  Consistent with PCAOB inspection reports, I provided a description of the 
inspection process which indicated that the number of audits inspected was left to the 
discretion of each inspection team, and that the number tended to vary widely between 
firms. The order of the two firms was counterbalanced to ensure no order effects. 
The reports contained audit deficiencies taken from actual PCAOB inspection 
reports. I designed the experiment so that the inspection report of Audit Firm A included 
three deficiencies discovered over two audits inspected, while the report for Audit Firm B 
included six deficiencies discovered over twelve audits inspected.18 I did this so that the 
number of anecdotes would favor Firm A (i.e., three vs. six audit deficiencies), while 
placing these anecdotes in statistical context would favor Firm B (i.e., 1.5 deficiencies 
per audit inspected for Firm A vs. 0.5 deficiencies per audit inspected for Firm B). This 
design feature provided me with a benchmark of participant attention to the statistical or 
anecdotal data. To ensure that the audit deficiencies were equally severe, I adapted fifty 
audit deficiencies from actual PCAOB inspection reports that I considered to be of 
moderate severity, and pre-tested them on sixty Master’s of Accounting students who 
rated their significance to audit quality on a scale of one to seven. From these, I selected 
nine deficiencies for inclusion in the experiment that had no significant differences in 
severity (F=0.446, p=0.893).  
 
                                               
17
 While the PCAOB allows use of its reports for a variety of purposes, it does not allow 
the use of its name if the reports are altered in any way, and so we use the name Federal 
Public Auditor Regulatory Board (FPARB). 
18
 I used the labels ‘Audit Firm ABC’ and ‘Audit Firm XYZ’ in the actual instrument. 
These labels were counterbalanced to ensure that no preference for firm name would 
affect the results. I provide the generic terms of ‘Firm A’ and ‘Firm B’ in the paper for 
ease of exposition. 
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Experimental Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of five experimental conditions: 
anecdotes only (PCAOB–L), statistics only, anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB–S), 
anecdotes & statistics–enhanced, and anecdotes & statistics–judgment orientation.  
The anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) condition provided reports with only detailed 
anecdotal information about each audit deficiency without any statistical context, as 
currently presented in the PCAOB reports for large audit firms (see Appendix). The 
statistics only condition did not provide detailed anecdotal information about each 
deficiency, but rather provided statistical data relative to the inspection (see Appendix). 
The data was presented in a table which gave the total number of clients inspected, the 
total number of clients where deficiencies were found, the total number of deficiencies 
found, the average number of deficiencies per client inspected, the ratio and percentage 
of clients with deficiencies to all clients inspected, and the ratio and percentage of clients 
without deficiencies to all clients inspected.  In addition, the reports included the audit 
area where the deficiencies were found (e.g., inventory, loan loss reserves, discontinued 
operations; see Appendix). These two conditions provide a benchmark that indicates the 
judgments made when only anecdotal or statistical data are provided. As such, they can 
be used to compare the incremental effect of the remaining three conditions that provide 
both anecdotal and statistical data.  
The anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB–S) condition presents the anecdotes exactly 
as in the anecdotes only condition, plus the statistical information in boilerplate language 
as currently presented by the PCAOB in its inspection reports for small audit firms (i.e., 
“PCAOB−S”). That is, users were told how many clients were inspected, how many 
deficiencies were found, and how many clients had deficiencies (see Appendix). As a 
result, all of the underlying statistical information in the statistics-only condition (e.g., the 
ratio of deficiencies per audit inspected, the number of audits with no deficiencies, the 
number of deficiencies on each audit) were implicitly available to participants in this 
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condition, although it was not explicitly presented since it is only implicit in the PCAOB 
inspection reports for small firms. 
The anecdotes & statistics–enhanced condition was a combination of the 
anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) and statistics only conditions.  The statistics were presented 
in a table as given in the Appendix. The anecdotes were placed in a second table, 
providing the same anecdotal information as given in the anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) 
condition (see Appendix). In this table, I placed the name of the client in the left column, 
the number of deficiencies uncovered at that client in the middle column, and the full 
anecdote in the right column. While the anecdotes provided were identical to those in the 
anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) condition, the table explicitly listed those clients where no 
deficiencies were found. This feature was added to reinforce the implications of the 
statistical data showing that, while deficiencies may have been found, certain client audits 
were, in fact, deficiency-free. 
Finally, the anecdotes & statistics–judgment orientation condition provided 
participants with audit firm reports that were identical to the anecdotes & statistics–
enhanced condition, except that an introduction was added to the beginning of each 
report reminding users that the scope of the inspections could vary widely between firms 
and that the sample size taken by the inspection team was not necessarily related to firm 
size or historical reputation for audit quality. The reports also had a disclaimer urging 
participants to appropriately consider the number of clients inspected in addition to the 
number of deficiencies found when making comparisons. This was done to focus 
attention on the statistical data so that the anecdotal data was put in its statistical context. 
 After reviewing the materials, participants were asked to make a choice between 
the two audit firms and indicate whether they held a slight, moderate, or strong 
preference for that choice. In addition to this primary dependent variable, I requested that 
participants answer two exploratory questions (i.e., I had no a priori reason to expect that 
assignment to the various conditions would affect participant responses). The first 
43 
 
question asked how credible they believed the audit profession to be today on a seven 
point Likert-type scale ranging from not very credible to very credible. The second 
question captured how effective they believed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been 
in uncovering and/or preventing audit failures in the last five years (on a similar seven 
point Likert-type scale ranging from very ineffective to very effective).  I also collected 
data on years of business experience, management or supervisory experience, age, and 
gender.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the data gathered. The results from my 
experimental analysis are presented in Table 4.1 and are represented graphically in Figure 
4.1. Since audit committees ultimately have to choose which audit firm to employ, the 
choice of firm A or B is my dependent variable of interest. I first examined whether the 
purely anecdotal versus purely statistical data sets resulted in participants choosing 
different audit firms. That is, did those in the anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) condition 
choose Firm A (i.e., the firm with fewer total deficiencies), and did those in the statistics 
only condition choose Firm B (i.e., the firm with the fewest deficiencies per audit)? These 
served as the benchmark for my analyses of the relative level of attention paid to 
anecdotal versus statistical data in the other experimental conditions. As expected, the 
results show that 68.2% (31.8%) of participants in the anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) 
condition selected Firm A (Firm B) while 17.9% (82.1%) of participants chose Firm A 
(Firm B) in the statistics only condition (χ2= 21.12,  p<0.001).  
Test of Hypothesis 1 Results 
  
I tested Hypothesis 1 by analyzing the extent to which the decisions in the 
anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB–S) condition differed from the decisions in the anecdotes 
only (PCAOB–L) condition. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 1, as 66.7% 
(33.3%) of participants in the anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB–S) condition selected Firm 
A (Firm B) as compared to 68.2% (31.8%) of participants in the anecdotes only 
(PCAOB–L) condition (χ2= 0.02, p=0.883). 
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TABLE 4.1 
Participants’ Auditor Selection Decisions 
 
Panel A:   Percent Choosing Firm Consistent with Anecdotal Data or Statistical Data  
 
Condition 
Anecdotes 
Consistenta 
Statistics 
Consistentb 
 
nc 
Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) 68.2% 31.8% 
 
44 
Anecdotes & Statistics (PCAOB−S) 66.7% 33.3% 
 
39 
Anecdotes & Statistics−Enhanced  40.0% 60.0% 
 
40 
Anecdotes & Statistics−Judgment Orientation 17.8% 82.2% 
 
45 
Statistics Only 17.9% 82.1% 
 
39 
 
Panel B:   Planned Contrasts  
Contrast Hypothesis 
 χ2 
 
p-valued 
Anecdotes & Statistics (PCAOB−S) 
          vs. Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) H1 
 
0.02 
 
0.883 
 
  
   Anecdotes & Statistics−Enhanced 
          vs. Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) H2 
 
6.72 
 
0.005 
          vs. Anecdotes & Statistics (PCAOB−S) H2  5.64 
 
0.009 
 
  
   Anecdotes & Statistics−Judgment Orientation 
          vs. Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) H3 
 
23.10 
 
< 0.001 
          vs. Anecdotes & Statistics (PCAOB−S) H3  20.23 
 
< 0.001 
          vs. Anecdotes & Statistics−Enhanced  H3  5.16 
 
0.012 
 
 
   Statistics Only  
             vs. Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L)  21.12 
 
< 0.001
          vs. Anecdotes & Statistics (PCAOB−S)  18.96 
 
< 0.001
          vs. Anecdotes & Statistics−Enhanced  4.65 
 
0.031
          vs. Anecdotes & Statistics−Judgment Orientation  0.00 
 
0.984
_______________________________ 
 
a
 Choices consistent with the implications of the anecdotal data (i.e., the firm having the fewest number of 
deficiencies in total). 
b Choices consistent with the implications of the statistical data (i.e., the firm having the fewest number of 
deficiencies per audit inspected). 
c Cell size differences are a result of the software generated random assignment of participants to treatment 
conditions. 
d
 Consistent with the hypotheses, our tests for H1 are two-tailed while tests for H2 & H3 are one-tailed. The 
remaining tests are all two-tailed. 
In the Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) condition, participants received inspection reports containing 
deficiencies only, as provided in the current PCAOB reports of large audit firms. In the Statistics Only 
condition, participants received inspection reports having visually enhanced and elaborated statistical 
information along with a listing of areas where deficiencies were found (i.e. inventory, loan loss reserves, 
revenue recognition). These conditions provided a benchmark for assessing participant attention to 
anecdotal and statistical data. In the Anecdotes & Statistics (PCAOB−S) condition, participants received 
inspection reports containing both deficiencies and statistical information as provided in the PCAOB 
reports of small audit firms. The Anecdotes & Statistics-Enhanced condition received reports that were a 
combination of the Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) and the Statistics Only conditions. The Anecdotes & 
Statistics-Judgment Orientation condition received the same information as the Anecdotes & Statistics-
Enhanced condition with an added manipulation drawing attention to the statistical portion of the reports. 
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FIGURE 4.1 
Percent of Participants Choosing the Audit Firm  
Consistent with the Implications of the Statistical Data 
 
In the Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) condition, participants received inspection reports containing 
deficiencies only, as provided in the current PCAOB reports of large audit firms. In the Statistics Only 
condition, participants received inspection reports having visually enhanced and elaborated statistical 
information along with a listing of areas where deficiencies were found (i.e. inventory, loan loss reserves, 
revenue recognition). These conditions provided a benchmark for assessing participant attention to 
anecdotal and statistical data. In the Anecdotes & Statistics (PCAOB−S) condition, participants received 
inspection reports containing both deficiencies and statistical information as provided in the PCAOB 
reports of small audit firms. The Anecdotes & Statistics-Enhanced condition received reports that were a 
combination of the Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) and the Statistics Only conditions. The Anecdotes & 
Statistics-Judgment Orientation condition received the same information as the Anecdotes & Statistics-
Enhanced condition with an added manipulation drawing attention to the statistical portion of the reports. 
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This indicates that participants failed to attend to the implications of the statistical data 
provided in small firm reports. This finding is consistent with the results of prior research 
that suggests decision makers ignore, or underweight, statistical data in the presence of 
anecdotes. The finding also serves to caution the PCAOB that their current practice of 
including statistics in the reports of small firms is unlikely to solve the lack of statistical 
context problem in large firm reports.   
 
Test of Hypothesis 2 Results 
 I tested Hypothesis 2 by analyzing the extent to which the decisions of 
participants in the anecdotes & statistics–enhanced condition demonstrated a greater 
assimilation of statistical data than those in both the anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) and 
anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB–S) conditions. The results support Hypothesis 2, as a 
greater percentage of participants in the anecdotes & statistics–enhanced condition 
(60.0%) selected Firm B (preference consistent with statistical data), than in both the 
anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) condition (31.8%; χ2= 6.72, p=0.005) and the anecdotes & 
statistics (PCAOB–S) condition (33.3%; χ2= 5.64, p=0.009).  It should be noted that 
participants in the two statistics conditions (anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB–S) and 
anecdotes & statistics–enhanced) were given data that reflected the same basic 
information. That is, all of the information given in the anecdotes & statistics–enhanced 
condition could be easily derived in the anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB—S) condition. 
The difference was the enhanced presentation of the statistical data.  
My results are consistent with prior research indicating that enhanced statistical 
data can help to improve the assimilation of statistics into decisions.  However, while a 
clear majority of participants (60.0%) attended to the statistical data, a rather large 
minority (40.0%) continued to exhibit anecdotal biases by ignoring, or underweighting, 
the statistical data in favor of the anecdotal data. This result is consistent with prior 
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research that anecdotal biases are robust, requiring substantial interventions to overcome 
our preference for anecdotal data. As such, I examine the incremental impact of judgment 
orientation. 
 
Test of Hypothesis 3 Results 
I tested Hypothesis 3 by analyzing the extent to which the decisions of 
participants in the anecdotes & statistics–judgment orientation condition differed from 
the decisions of those in the anecdotes only (PCAOB–L), the anecdotes & statistics 
(PCAOB–S), and the anecdotes & statistics–enhanced conditions. The intention of this 
manipulation was to provide a more forceful intervention for overcoming powerful 
anecdotal biases. Recall that participants in this condition were cautioned that the scope 
of the inspections could vary widely between firms and that the sample size taken by the 
inspection team was not necessarily related to firm size or historical reputation for audit 
quality. They were also urged to appropriately consider the number of clients inspected in 
addition to the number of deficiencies found when making comparisons.  
The results support Hypothesis 3, as a greater percentage of participants in the 
anecdotes & statistics–judgment orientation condition (82.2%) selected Firm B 
(preference consistent with statistical data), than in the anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) 
condition (31.8%; χ2= 23.10, p<0.001), the anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB–S) condition 
(33.3%; χ2= 20.23, p<0.001), and the anecdotes & statistics–enhanced condition (60.0%; 
χ
2
= 5.16, p=0.012). My results are consistent with prior psychology research and suggest 
that providing a statistical judgment orientation in addition to enhancing the statistics can 
successfully aid in increasing attention to, and assimilation of, statistical data in 
participants’ decisions. 
In addition to the decision variable, I gathered data on strength of preference (i.e., 
slightly prefer, moderately prefer, strongly prefer). I combined the participants’ decision 
with their strength of preference to create a six-point scale. The judgment orientation 
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decision aid (H3) again resulted in a significantly higher strength of preference for Firm 
B in the anecdotes & statistics-judgment orientation condition relative to both the 
anecdotes-only (PCAOB-L) and anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB-S) conditions (both p’s 
<0.001), and while it was greater than the anecdotes & statistics – enhanced condition, 
the significance level was p=0.16. Thus, the judgment orientation decision aid influenced 
decisions significantly more than the enhanced statistical presentation alone (82.2% vs. 
60.0%, p=0.012), but only marginally farther up the six-point scale. As with the decision 
variable, I found an insignificant contrast consistent with H1 (p=0.92), and I found even 
stronger support for H2 (both p’s <0.001). Overall, my findings suggest that these two 
decision aids effectively help participants incorporate statistics into their decisions. 
 
Additional Analyses 
 
 In addition to the dependent variable of interest, I collected data on participant 
perceptions of the credibility of the audit profession and whether they believed the 
current regulatory oversight had been effective in uncovering and/or preventing audit 
failures in the past five years. An analysis of the responses to these questions yielded no 
differences in perceptions of audit profession credibility (F = 0.107, p = 0.98) or the 
effectiveness of regulatory oversight (F = 1.007, p = 0.41) across the five conditions. The 
overall means across all conditions on the seven point scales were 4.35 for credibility and 
4.20 for regulatory effectiveness.  
 I also found no differences between conditions relating to their business 
experience (µ = 8.69, F = 0.156, p = 0.96), management experience (µ = 4.19, F = 0.506, 
p = 0.73), age (µ = 33.5, F = 1.037, p = 0.39), or gender (69% male and 31% female, χ2 = 
8.647,  p = 0.37).  
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Summary 
 Overall, the analyses indicate that participants failed to attend to the implications 
of statistical data when presented in reports containing both anecdotal and statistical data 
(as in small firm reports). The findings indicate that without statistical context, 
misperceptions of audit firm quality are a potential problem and that even when statistical 
data are present, those misperceptions can persist as a result of an anecdotal bias. This 
serves to caution the PCAOB that their current practice of providing statistical 
information in small firm reports is unlikely to solve the lack of statistical context 
problem in large firm reports. However, the analyses do point to the efficacy of using 
statistical enhancements and judgment orientation as potentially effective decision aids.  
 
Analyses Using the Manager Subset 
 
Managers Only Analysis 
 
 As previously mentioned, 152 of the participants in the study were experienced 
managers.  Since an argument can be made that experienced managers might be 
considered a marginally more representative participant pool, I re-ran all of the analyses 
using only that participant base to see whether this significant sub-group behave any 
differently.  
 The results from my experimental analysis of the manager sub-group are 
presented in Table 4.2 and are represented graphically in Figure 4.2. As in the first 
analysis using all 207 participants, I first examined whether the purely anecdotal versus 
purely statistical data sets resulted in managers choosing different audit firms. That is, did 
managers in the anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) condition choose Firm A (i.e., the firm with 
fewer total deficiencies), and did managers in the statistics only condition choose Firm B 
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(i.e., the firm with the fewest deficiencies per audit). Recall that these served as my 
benchmark for my analyses of the relative level of attention paid by managers to 
anecdotal versus statistical data in my other experimental conditions. As expected, the 
results show that 63.9% (36.1%) of managers in the anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) 
condition selected Firm A (Firm B) while only 13.8% (86.2%) of managers chose Firm A 
(Firm B) in the statistics only condition (χ2= 16.60,  p<0.001). This finding is consistent 
with the first analysis using the full 207 participants. 
Test of Hypothesis 1 Using Managers Only 
 To see whether my analysis and conclusions would differ using the manager 
subgroup, I next tested Hypothesis 1 by analyzing the extent to which the decisions of 
managers only in the anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB–S) condition differed from the 
decisions of managers only in the anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) condition. These results 
are also consistent with the prior inclusion of all participants and Hypothesis 1, as 61.5% 
(38.5%) of managers in the anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB–S) condition selected Firm A 
(Firm B) as compared to 63.9% (36.1%) of managers in the anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) 
condition (χ2= 0.04, p=0.85). This indicates that managers failed to attend to the 
implications of the statistical data provided in small firm reports. This finding is 
consistent with the results of the prior analysis that suggests decision makers ignore, or 
underweight, statistical data in the presence of anecdotes.  
Test of Hypothesis 2 Using Managers Only  
 
 I next tested Hypothesis 2 by analyzing the extent to which the decisions of 
managers in the anecdotes & statistics–enhanced condition demonstrated a greater  
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TABLE 4.2 
Managers’ Auditor Selection Decisions 
 
Panel A:   Percent Choosing Firm Consistent with Anecdotal Data or Statistical Data  
 
Condition 
Anecdotes 
Consistenta 
Statistics 
Consistentb 
 
nc 
Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) 63.9% 36.1% 
 
36 
Anecdotes & Statistics (PCAOB−S) 61.5% 38.5% 
 
26 
Anecdotes & Statistics−Enhanced  42.9% 57.1% 
 
28 
Anecdotes & Statistics−Judgment Orientation 18.2% 81.8% 
 
33 
Statistics Only 13.8% 86.2% 
 
29 
 
Panel B:   Planned Contrasts  
Contrast Hypothesis 
 χ2 
 
p-valued 
Anecdotes & Statistics (PCAOB−S) 
          vs. Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) H1 
 
0.04 
 
0.850 
 
  
   Anecdotes & Statistics−Enhanced 
          vs. Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) H2 
 
2.81 
 
0.047 
          vs. Anecdotes & Statistics (PCAOB−S) H2  1.89 
 
0.085 
 
  
   Anecdotes & Statistics−Judgment Orientation 
          vs. Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) H3 
 
14.76 
 
< 0.001 
          vs. Anecdotes & Statistics (PCAOB−S) H3  11.69 
 
< 0.001 
          vs. Anecdotes & Statistics−Enhanced  H3  4.43 
 
0.018 
 
 
   Statistics Only  
             vs. Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L)  16.60 
 
< 0.001 
          vs. Anecdotes & Statistics (PCAOB−S)  13.51 
 
< 0.001 
          vs. Anecdotes & Statistics−Enhanced  5.96 
 
0.015 
          vs. Anecdotes & Statistics−Judgment Orientation  0.22 
 
0.639 
_____________________________ 
 
a
 Choices consistent with the implications of the anecdotal data (i.e., the firm having the fewest number of 
deficiencies in total). 
b Choices consistent with the implications of the statistical data (i.e., the firm having the fewest number of 
deficiencies per audit inspected). 
c Cell size differences are a result of the software generated random assignment of participants to treatment 
conditions. 
d
 Consistent with the hypotheses, our tests for H1 are two-tailed while tests for H2 & H3 are one-tailed. The 
remaining tests are all two-tailed. 
In the Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) condition, participants received inspection reports containing 
deficiencies only, as provided in the current PCAOB reports of large audit firms. In the Statistics Only 
condition, participants received inspection reports having visually enhanced and elaborated statistical 
information along with a listing of areas where deficiencies were found (i.e. inventory, loan loss reserves, 
revenue recognition). These conditions provided a benchmark for assessing participant attention to 
anecdotal and statistical data. In the Anecdotes & Statistics (PCAOB−S) condition, participants received 
inspection reports containing both deficiencies and statistical information as provided in the PCAOB 
reports of small audit firms. The Anecdotes & Statistics-Enhanced condition received reports that were a 
combination of the Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) and the Statistics Only conditions. The Anecdotes & 
Statistics-Judgment Orientation condition received the same information as the Anecdotes & Statistics-
Enhanced condition with an added manipulation drawing attention to the statistical portion of the reports. 
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FIGURE 4.2 
Percent of Managers Choosing the Audit Firm  
Consistent with the Implications of the Statistical Data 
 
In the Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) condition, participants received inspection reports containing 
deficiencies only, as provided in the current PCAOB reports of large audit firms. In the Statistics Only 
condition, participants received inspection reports having visually enhanced and elaborated statistical 
information along with a listing of areas where deficiencies were found (i.e. inventory, loan loss reserves, 
revenue recognition). These conditions provided a benchmark for assessing participant attention to 
anecdotal and statistical data. In the Anecdotes & Statistics (PCAOB−S) condition, participants received 
inspection reports containing both deficiencies and statistical information as provided in the PCAOB 
reports of small audit firms. The Anecdotes & Statistics-Enhanced condition received reports that were a 
combination of the Anecdotes Only (PCAOB−L) and the Statistics Only conditions. The Anecdotes & 
Statistics-Judgment Orientation condition received the same information as the Anecdotes & Statistics-
Enhanced condition with an added manipulation drawing attention to the statistical portion of the reports. 
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assimilation of statistical data than managers in both the anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) and 
anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB–S) conditions. The results are consistent with the original 
analysis and support Hypothesis 2, as a greater percentage of managers in the anecdotes 
& statistics–enhanced condition (57.1%) selected Firm B (preference consistent with 
statistical data), than both the anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) condition (36.1%; χ2= 2.81, 
p=0.047) and the anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB–S) condition (38.5%; χ2= 1.89, 
p=0.085). This last analysis was the only condition that differed slightly from the full 
analysis with all participants included where a marginal significance of p=0.085 was 
found between the anecdotes & statistics–enhanced condition versus the anecdotes & 
statistics (PCAOB–S). While this was only marginally significant (the analysis using all 
207 participants found the significance between these two conditions to be p=0.009) the 
results are in the same expected direction and I draw the same conclusions as in the 
original analysis.  
 It should be noted again that, as was the case with all participants, managers in the 
two statistics conditions (anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB–S) and anecdotes & statistics–
enhanced) were given data that reflected the same basic information. That is, all of the 
information given in the anecdotes & statistics–enhanced condition could be easily 
derived in the anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB—S) condition. The difference was the 
enhanced presentation of the statistical data.  
Also consistent with what was found in the original analysis, while a clear 
majority of managers (57.1%) attended to the statistical data, a rather large minority 
(42.9%) continued to exhibit anecdotal biases by ignoring, or underweighting, the 
statistical data in favor of the anecdotal data. This result is consistent with prior research 
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that anecdotal biases are robust, requiring substantial interventions to overcome my 
preference for anecdotal data. As such, I examine the incremental impact of judgment 
orientation on the manager sub-group. 
Test of Hypothesis 3 Using Managers Only 
To see whether the findings would be consistent in the managers only subgroup, I 
tested Hypothesis 3 by analyzing the extent to which managers in the anecdotes & 
statistics–judgment orientation condition differed from the judgments of managers only 
in the anecdotes only (PCAOB–L), the anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB–S), and the 
anecdotes & statistics–enhanced conditions. Recall, the intention of this manipulation 
was to provide a more forceful intervention for overcoming powerful anecdotal biases. 
All participants in this condition were cautioned that the scope of the inspections could 
vary widely between firms and that the sample size taken by the inspection team was not 
necessarily related to firm size or historical reputation for audit quality. They were also 
urged to appropriately consider the number of clients inspected in addition to the number 
of deficiencies found when making comparisons. The results are again consistent with the 
prior analysis and support Hypothesis 3, as a greater percentage of managers in the 
anecdotes & statistics–judgment orientation condition (81.8%) selected Firm B 
(preference consistent with statistical data), than in the anecdotes only (PCAOB–L) 
condition (36.1%; χ2= 14.76, p<0.001), the anecdotes & statistics (PCAOB–S) condition 
(38.5%; χ2= 11.69, p<0.001), and the anecdotes & statistics–enhanced condition (57.1%; 
χ
2
= 4.43, p=0.018). Again, these results are consistent with prior psychology research and 
suggest that providing a statistical judgment orientation in addition to enhancing the 
statistics can successfully aid in increasing attention to, and assimilation of, statistical 
data in managers’ decisions. 
Recall that I also gathered data on the strength of preference (i.e., slightly prefer, 
moderately prefer, strongly prefer). As in the previous analysis, I combined the 
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managers’ strength of preference with their decision to create a six-point scale. The 
judgment orientation decision aid (H3) again increased managers’ preference for Firm B 
over the anecdotes-only (PCAOB-L) and anecdotes & statistics-(PCAOB-S) conditions 
(both p’s <0.001) and while the means were in the right direction when compared to the 
anecdotes & statistics – enhanced decision aid condition, the difference was not 
statistically significant (p=0.31). Thus, the judgment orientation decision aid influenced 
the manager’s choice of firms significantly more than the enhanced statistical 
presentation alone (81.8% vs. 57.1%, p=0.018), but only marginally farther up the six-
point scale. As with the decision variable, we find an insignificant contrast consistent 
with H1 (p=0.89) and even stronger support for H2 (both p’s <0.001). Overall, all of my 
findings suggest that these two decision aids effectively helped the managers only sub-
group to incorporate statistics into their decision. 
 
Additional Analyses 
 
 In addition to the dependent variable of interest, I collected data on participant 
perceptions of the credibility of the audit profession and whether they believed the 
current regulatory oversight had been effective in uncovering and/or preventing audit 
failures in the past five years. An analysis of the responses to these questions yielded no 
differences in manager’s perceptions of audit profession credibility (F = 0.403, p = 0.81) 
or the effectiveness of regulatory oversight (F = 2.311, p = 0.06) across the five 
conditions. The overall mean across all conditions on the seven point scales were 4.28 for 
credibility and 4.2 for regulatory effectiveness.  
 I also find no differences between conditions relating to their business experience 
(µ = 10.25, F = 0.751, p = 0.56), management experience (µ = 5.70, F = 0.699, p = 0.59), 
age (µ = 35.6, F = 0.673, p = 0.61), or gender (67% male and 33% female, χ2 = 6.515,  p 
= 0.59). 
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Summary 
Overall, the analyses using the managers only sub-group are consistent with the 
previous analyses using all 207 participants. The analyses indicate that managers failed to 
attend to the implications of the statistical data when presented with reports containing 
both anecdotal and statistical data, as presented in small firm reports. The findings 
indicate that without statistical context, misperceptions of audit firm quality are a 
potential problem and that even when statistical data are added, those misperceptions can 
persist as a result of an anecdotal bias. Again, this serves to caution the PCAOB that their 
current practice of providing statistical information in small firm reports is unlikely to 
solve the lack of statistical context problem in large firm reports. The analyses also points 
to the efficacy of using statistical enhancements and judgment orientation as potentially 
effective decision aids. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Audit committees are tasked with making auditor engagement and/or retention 
decisions from among competing firms, often with scant publicly available indicators of 
auditor quality. For better or worse, the PCAOB inspection reports are currently the only 
independent regulatory reporting on audit firm performance. The PCAOB reports for 
large firms are primarily anecdotal in nature, providing little more than a listing of 
deficiencies uncovered by the PCAOB inspection team, without any statistical context at 
all. The PCAOB reports for small firms contain the contextual data necessary for making 
meaningful comparisons across firms. However, prior research indicates that statistical 
data are often ignored or underweighted when anecdotal data are present, possibly 
resulting in inattention to the statistical data as presented in small firm reports. 
 This study demonstrates that the anecdotal data presented in PCAOB reports can 
lead to incorrect perceptions of audit firms. I also find that the PCAOB’s practice of 
providing statistical context in small firm reports is ineffective; that is, users continue to 
focus on anecdotal data even in the presence of potentially more informative statistical 
data. As a result, I tested two easily implemented decision aids, a vividness enhancement 
and a judgment orientation, which were successful in helping participants incorporate 
statistical data into perceptions of audit firms, resulting in more informed audit 
engagement decisions. 
 The results of this study suggest that the current reporting of the PCAOB is 
flawed and can lead to misperceptions of a firm’s audit performance, which can 
negatively affect auditor engagement decisions. My research offers, as a simple 
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prescription for improving the current reports, vividness enhancement and statistical 
judgment orientation as a way to minimize an observed anecdotal bias. As such, the 
improved reports can begin to produce the type of information that may be used to better 
assess firm performance and result in more informed audit engagement and retention 
decisions. 
Limitations 
 One potential limitation of the study is that the participants used in the experiment 
were not actual audit committee members per se. However, as argued earlier in this 
paper, I conducted a review of audit committees of public companies and found a wide 
range of professional backgrounds and experience levels that were consistent with my 
sample. For example, audit committee members included managers, lawyers, physicians, 
engineers and other professionals across a variety of industries. So while my participants 
may not have been actively sitting on an audit committee, their experience and 
backgrounds do qualify them to serve on boards of directors and audit committees of 
many companies across a range of industries.  
 Another limitation is that in order to keep the sample size of participants to a 
manageable level, the experimental design was not fully crossed. I did not evaluate the 
judgment orientation decision aid as a stand-alone intervention.  Recall that the judgment 
orientation was applied in addition to the enhanced statistical presentation and as a result 
I was unable to cleanly separate its effect on participant choices. Future research could 
look to see whether the judgment orientation decision aid alone would be sufficient in 
overcoming any anecdotal biases.  
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Suggestions for Future Research 
 The results of the study suggest a number of fruitful areas for future research. 
Consistent with prior psychology research, I found that anecdotal biases occur when 
evaluating PCAOB inspection reports, which can lead to incorrect perceptions of audit 
firms. Future research could investigate whether anecdotal biases are prevalent in other 
areas of accounting.  This study identified two decision aids that help to increase 
attention to statistical data, thereby mitigating the anecdotal bias. Future research could 
identify and test the efficacy of other decision aids in overcoming this observed bias.  
 The US Department of the Treasury’s Advisory Committee on the Auditing 
Profession (2008) has recommended that the PCOAB, in collaboration with industry and 
academics, identify indicators of audit quality in order to help audit committees make 
auditor engagement decisions. While future research may succeed in identifying 
additional indicators of audit quality that can be made available to audit committees for 
such use, this study serves to caution the manner in which that data is included. This 
study found that the anecdotal data presented in PCAOB inspection reports were 
powerfully persuasive, overwhelming the statistical information provided and may 
likewise, affect the assimilation of other indicators of audit quality into audit engagement 
and retention decisions.  
My results suggest that the current reporting of the PCAOB is flawed and can lead 
to misperceptions of a firm’s audit performance, which can negatively affect auditor 
engagement decisions.  I offer, as a simple prescription for improving the current reports, 
vividness enhancement and statistical judgment orientation as a way to minimize an 
observed anecdotal bias. As such, the improved reports can produce the type of 
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information that may be used to better assess firm performance and result in more 
informed audit engagement and retention decisions. 
 
 
62 
 
 
APPENDIX 
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
The instruments that participants received are presented on the following pages. A short 
description is provided before each instrument describing which of the five conditions it 
relates to and the information provided. 
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Introduction and Background Information 
 
The following contains the study’s introduction and background information which was 
provided to participants in each condition. 
 
 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research study. 
  
The purpose of the study is to investigate decisions concerning the selection of audit 
firms.  Your participation is voluntary and any responses you provide will be kept 
completely anonymous.  The study should only take about 15-20 minutes to complete. 
  
This study looks at certain factors involved in the selection of an external auditor for a 
given company. While we understand that many factors may go into making decisions of 
this kind, we are interested in the information presented here and how it would impact 
your professional judgment.  
  
Please read the following case study and answer the questions provided. 
  
If you have any questions about this research, please contact James Wainberg at 
jamesw@som.umass.edu. 
 
 
Please provide your name and the course you are attending so that we may add you to the 
raffle for an 8 GB IPod nano and also to remove you from further emails requesting your 
participation.  Your information will be kept completely confidential. 
 
Thanks again for your participation! 
 
First Name 
 
Last Name 
 
Course Name 
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Auditor Selection for Jefferson Circuit Assembly 
  
You are a member of the committee that selects the external auditor for Jefferson Circuit 
Assembly, a medium sized publicly-traded electronics manufacturing company.  The 
audit committee is currently reviewing the credentials of prospective accounting firms to 
perform next year’s audit. The committee has narrowed the decision down to two firms, 
Firm ABC and Firm XYZ.  The two firms are identical in size and both have historically 
enjoyed a good reputation for offering quality audit services. 
  
In addition to reviewing the promotional materials provided to you by each firm, you 
obtain and review the publicly available Federal Public Auditor Regulatory Board 
(FPARB) inspection reports for each firm. The FPARB performs yearly inspections on 
accounting firms that audit publicly-traded companies to ensure the quality and integrity 
of the audit profession.  In other words, the FPARB’s job is to ‘audit the auditors’. 
  
The FPARB inspection process involves selecting a sample of the Firm’s audit clients 
and then reviewing the conduct of each of those audits. The number of clients selected is 
left to the discretion of each FPARB inspection team and tends to vary widely between 
firms (some firms may have many clients inspected while other firms may have fewer). 
Each deficiency uncovered by the inspectors is reported as a failure on the part of the 
accounting firm to sufficiently perform its duties at a given client. 
  
The FPARB inspection reports for the two accounting firms you are considering are 
provided on the pages that follow. The FPARB inspection reports contain excerpts from 
actual Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports. The 
reports are shortened to include only the section entitled “Review of Audit 
Engagements.” After reviewing the inspection reports, you will be asked to make a 
choice as to which accounting firm you would choose to hire for your company’s year-
end audit. 
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ANECDOTES ONLY (PCAOB-L) CONDITION 
 
This condition provided participants with inspection reports containing only anecdotal 
deficiencies (as provided in PCAOB large firm inspection reports).  One report contained 
three deficiencies while the other had six deficiencies. Consistent with large firm PCAOB 
reports, no contextual statistics were provided. 
The reports were counterbalanced to ensure no order effects.
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FPARB Release Number 194-2008-020 
Inspection of Audit Firm ABC   
2008 
 
A. Review of Audit Engagements 
  
The scope of the inspection procedures performed included reviews of aspects of selected 
audits of financial statements and of internal control over financial reporting performed 
by Firm ABC. In reviewing the audits, the inspection team identified matters that it 
considered to be audit deficiencies. The deficiencies identified were of such significance 
that it appeared to the inspection team that Firm ABC, at the time it issued its audit 
report, had not obtained sufficient competent evidential matter to support its opinion on 
the client's financial statements. The deficiencies that reached this degree of significance 
are described below. 
  
Client A 
  
In this audit, Firm ABC failed to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support 
its audit opinion in the following respect– 
 
 ·          The Firm failed to perform sufficient procedures with respect to using the findings 
of a specialist hired by the client to determine the fair value assigned to acquired in-
process research and development. There was no evidence in the audit documentation, 
and no persuasive other evidence, that the Firm had obtained an understanding of certain 
critical methods and assumptions that the specialist used, or that it had performed tests of 
certain critical data provided to the specialist. 
 
 Client B 
 
 In this audit, Firm ABC failed to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support 
its audit opinion in the following two respects – 
 
 ·          When testing inventory, the Firm relied on the client's inventory cycle count 
process without appropriately evaluating the design of the cycle count controls or testing 
the cycle count procedures. For example, the Firm failed to test the client's cycle count 
process to evaluate whether all inventory items were subject to cycle counting and 
whether the reports that were used in the process were complete and accurate. In addition, 
the Firm observed and concurrently tested only a single cycle count, although the Firm 
relied on this control to function effectively throughout the year. 
 
 ·          The client had a note receivable from a shareholder that was secured by the 
shareholder's ownership interest in the client. The client considered the collection of the 
note to be uncertain and determined that the value of the note receivable should be based 
on the value of the shareholder's ownership interest in the client. The Firm, however, 
failed to obtain information to corroborate management's representations by, for example, 
making inquiries of the client's lawyers. 
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 FPARB Release Number 197-2008-036 
Inspection of Audit Firm XYZ   
2008 
 
A. Review of Audit Engagements 
  
The scope of the inspection procedures performed included reviews of aspects of selected 
audits of financial statements and of internal control over financial reporting performed 
by Firm XYZ. In reviewing the audits, the inspection team identified matters that it 
considered to be audit deficiencies. The deficiencies identified were of such significance 
that it appeared to the inspection team that Firm XYZ, at the time it issued its audit 
report, had not obtained sufficient competent evidential matter to support its opinion on 
the client's financial statements. The deficiencies that reached this degree of significance 
are described below. 
  
Client A 
 
 In this audit, Firm XYZ failed to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support 
its audit opinion in the following respect– 
  
·          The client held investments in certain illiquid securities. The Firm failed to 
perform sufficient procedures to evaluate the client's valuation of these securities. While 
the Firm obtained an understanding of the process the client had used to obtain 
information regarding the fair value of the securities and performed other audit 
procedures, the Firm failed to evaluate the reasonableness of certain of the assumptions 
related to the underlying information used to develop and support the estimated fair 
values. 
  
Client B 
 
 In this audit, Firm XYZ failed to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support 
its audit opinion in the following two respects– 
  
·          When testing inventory, the Firm applied a controls reliance strategy, which 
included reliance on IT controls. The Firm's work papers indicated that the results of its 
tests of the client's information technology general controls did not support a conclusion 
that the client's information processing was reliable. The Firm, however, did not perform 
any additional procedures to address its finding, nor did it modify its audit strategy. 
  
·          The Firm tested minimum rental income primarily through the use of analytical 
procedures that did not meet the requirements for substantive analytical procedures. The 
Firm did not set an expectation that was precise enough to provide the desired level of 
assurance that differences that may be potential material misstatements, individually or 
when aggregated, would be identified for investigation. 
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Client C 
 
 In this audit, Firm XYZ failed to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support 
its audit opinion in the following respect– 
  
·          The Firm did not perform sufficient audit procedures to test the allowance for loan 
losses. The Firm's procedures for certain loans were limited to recalculating and 
comparing reserve factors from the current year to prior years and obtaining explanations 
from the client for changes. With respect to other loans, the Firm's procedures were 
limited to recalculating the factors. 
  
Client D 
 
 In this audit, Firm XYZ failed to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support 
its audit opinion in the following two respects– 
 
 ·          There was no evidence in the audit documentation, and no persuasive other 
evidence, that the Firm had evaluated whether the client's use of the straight-line method 
of amortization for acquired customer-related intangible assets reflected the pattern in 
which the economic benefits of the intangible asset were being consumed or otherwise 
used up. In addition, the Firm failed to evaluate whether, in light of actual customer 
attrition rates, the asset's life should have been adjusted. 
  
·          The Firm failed to perform, or failed to include in the work papers evidence that it 
performed, sufficient analysis to assess the appropriateness of the client's classification of 
a divested business as a discontinued operation. In connection with the divestiture, the 
client entered into certain agreements with the acquirer which called into question 
whether the operations and cash flows of the divested business would be eliminated from 
the ongoing operations of the client, and thus whether presentation of the divested 
business as a discontinued operation was appropriate. 
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STATISTICS ONLY CONDITION 
 
This condition provided participants with inspection reports containing only statistical 
information and the audit area in which the deficiencies was found. The statistics 
provided the total number of clients inspected, the number of clients where deficiencies 
were found, the total number of deficiencies found, the average number of deficiencies 
per client inspected, the ratio and percentage of clients with deficiencies to all clients 
inspected, and the ratio and percentage of clients without deficiencies to all clients 
inspected. 
The reports were counterbalanced to ensure no order effects.
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FPARB Release Number 194-2008-020 
Inspection of Audit Firm ABC   
2008 
 
A. Review of Audit Engagements 
 
The scope of the inspection procedures performed included reviews of aspects of selected 
audits of financial statements and of internal control over financial reporting performed 
by Firm ABC on two clients. In reviewing the audits, the inspection team identified a 
total of three matters across two clients that it considered to be audit deficiencies. The 
deficiencies identified were of such significance that it appeared to the inspection team 
that Firm ABC, at the time it issued its audit report, had not obtained sufficient competent 
evidential matter to support its opinion on the client's financial statements. The 
deficiencies that reached this degree of significance are described below. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ACROSS ALL CLIENTS INSPECTED 
 
Total Number of Clients Inspected: 2 
 
 
Total Number of Clients Where Deficiencies Were Found: 2 
 
 
Total Number of Deficiencies Found: 3 
 
 
Average Number of Deficiencies Per Client Inspected: 1.5 
 
 
Ratio (%) of Clients With Deficiencies To All Clients Inspected: 2/2 (100%) 
 
 
Ratio (%) of Clients Without Deficiencies To All Clients Inspected:   0/2 (0%) 
 
 
 
Results by Client Inspected For Audit Firm ABC: 
 
Client 
Inspected 
Deficiencies 
Found Area of Audit Deficiency 
Client A 1 1. Fair-Value Assessment 
Client B 2 1. Inventory   2. Notes Receivable 
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FPARB Release Number 197-2008-036 
Inspection of Audit Firm XYZ   
2008 
 
A. Review of Audit Engagements 
 
The scope of the inspection procedures performed included reviews of aspects of selected 
audits of financial statements and of internal control over financial reporting performed 
by Firm XYZ on twelve clients. In reviewing the audits, the inspection team identified a 
total of six matters across four clients that it considered to be audit deficiencies. The 
deficiencies identified were of such significance that it appeared to the inspection team 
that Firm XYZ, at the time it issued its audit report, had not obtained sufficient competent 
evidential matter to support its opinion on the client's financial statements. The 
deficiencies that reached this degree of significance are described below. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ACROSS ALL CLIENTS INSPECTED 
 
Total Number of Clients Inspected: 12 
 
 
Total Number of Clients Where Deficiencies Were Found: 4 
 
 
Total Number of Deficiencies Found: 6 
 
 
Average Number of Deficiencies Per Client Inspected: 0.5 
 
 
Ratio (%) of Clients With Deficiencies To All Clients Inspected: 4/12 (33%) 
 
 
Ratio (%) of Clients Without Deficiencies To All Clients Inspected: 8/12 (67%) 
 
 
 
Results by Client Inspected For Audit Firm XYZ: 
 
Client 
Inspected 
Deficiencies 
Found Area of Audit Deficiency 
Client A 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client B 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client C 1 1. Security Valuation 
Client D 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client E 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client F 2 1. Inventory   2. Rental Income 
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Results by Client Inspected For Firm XYZ Continued: 
 
Client 
Inspected 
Deficiencies 
Found Area of Audit Deficiency 
Client G 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client H 1 1.  Loan Loss Reserves 
Client I 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client J 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client K 2 1. Intangible Assets  2. Discontinued Operations 
Client L 0 No Deficiencies Found 
 
 
 
73 
 
 
ANECDOTES & STATISTICS (PCAOB-S) CONDITION 
 
This condition provided participants with inspection reports containing anecdotal 
deficiencies identical to those in the Anecdotes Only (PCAOB-L) condition and 
statistical information (as provided in PCAOB small firm reports). The statistics provided 
the total number of clients that were inspected, the number of clients where deficiencies 
were found, and the total number of deficiencies found. 
The reports were counterbalanced to ensure no order effects.
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FPARB Release Number 194-2008-020 
Inspection of Audit Firm ABC   
2008 
 
A. Review of Audit Engagements 
 
The scope of the inspection procedures performed included reviews of aspects of selected 
audits of financial statements and of internal control over financial reporting performed 
by Firm ABC on two clients. In reviewing the audits, the inspection team identified a 
total of three matters across two clients that it considered to be audit deficiencies. The 
deficiencies identified were of such significance that it appeared to the inspection team 
that Firm ABC, at the time it issued its audit report, had not obtained sufficient competent 
evidential matter to support its opinion on the client's financial statements. The 
deficiencies that reached this degree of significance are described below. 
 
Client A 
 
 In this audit, Firm ABC failed to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support 
its audit opinion in the following respect– 
 
 ·          The Firm failed to perform sufficient procedures with respect to using the findings 
of a specialist hired by the client to determine the fair value assigned to acquired in-
process research and development. There was no evidence in the audit documentation, 
and no persuasive other evidence, that the Firm had obtained an understanding of certain 
critical methods and assumptions that the specialist used, or that it had performed tests of 
certain critical data provided to the specialist. 
 
 Client B 
 
 In this audit, Firm ABC failed to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support 
its audit opinion in the following two respects – 
 
 ·          When testing inventory, the Firm relied on the client's inventory cycle count 
process without appropriately evaluating the design of the cycle count controls or testing 
the cycle count procedures. For example, the Firm failed to test the client's cycle count 
process to evaluate whether all inventory items were subject to cycle counting and 
whether the reports that were used in the process were complete and accurate. In addition, 
the Firm observed and concurrently tested only a single cycle count, although the Firm 
relied on this control to function effectively throughout the year. 
 
 ·          The client had a note receivable from a shareholder that was secured by the 
shareholder's ownership interest in the client. The client considered the collection of the 
note to be uncertain and determined that the value of the note receivable should be based 
on the value of the shareholder's ownership interest in the client. The Firm, however, 
failed to obtain information to corroborate management's representations by, for example, 
making inquiries of the client's lawyers. 
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FPARB Release Number 197-2008-036 
Inspection of Audit Firm XYZ   
2008 
 
A. Review of Audit Engagements 
 
The scope of the inspection procedures performed included reviews of aspects of selected 
audits of financial statements and of internal control over financial reporting performed 
by Firm XYZ on twelve clients. In reviewing the audits, the inspection team identified a 
total of six matters across four clients that it considered to be audit deficiencies. The 
deficiencies identified were of such significance that it appeared to the inspection team 
that Firm XYZ, at the time it issued its audit report, had not obtained sufficient competent 
evidential matter to support its opinion on the client's financial statements. The 
deficiencies that reached this degree of significance are described below. 
 
 Client A 
 
 In this audit, Firm XYZ failed to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support 
its audit opinion in the following respect– 
  
·          The client held investments in certain illiquid securities. The Firm failed to 
perform sufficient procedures to evaluate the client's valuation of these securities. While 
the Firm obtained an understanding of the process the client had used to obtain 
information regarding the fair value of the securities and performed other audit 
procedures, the Firm failed to evaluate the reasonableness of certain of the assumptions 
related to the underlying information used to develop and support the estimated fair 
values. 
  
Client B 
 
 In this audit, Firm XYZ failed to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support 
its audit opinion in the following two respects– 
  
·          When testing inventory, the Firm applied a controls reliance strategy, which 
included reliance on IT controls. The Firm's work papers indicated that the results of its 
tests of the client's information technology general controls did not support a conclusion 
that the client's information processing was reliable. The Firm, however, did not perform 
any additional procedures to address its finding, nor did it modify its audit strategy. 
  
·          The Firm tested minimum rental income primarily through the use of analytical 
procedures that did not meet the requirements for substantive analytical procedures. The 
Firm did not set an expectation that was precise enough to provide the desired level of 
assurance that differences that may be potential material misstatements, individually or 
when aggregated, would be identified for investigation. 
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Client C 
 
 In this audit, Firm XYZ failed to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support 
its audit opinion in the following respect– 
  
·          The Firm did not perform sufficient audit procedures to test the allowance for loan 
losses. The Firm's procedures for certain loans were limited to recalculating and 
comparing reserve factors from the current year to prior years and obtaining explanations 
from the client for changes. With respect to other loans, the Firm's procedures were 
limited to recalculating the factors. 
  
Client D 
 
 In this audit, Firm XYZ failed to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support 
its audit opinion in the following two respects– 
 
 ·          There was no evidence in the audit documentation, and no persuasive other 
evidence, that the Firm had evaluated whether the client's use of the straight-line method 
of amortization for acquired customer-related intangible assets reflected the pattern in 
which the economic benefits of the intangible asset were being consumed or otherwise 
used up. In addition, the Firm failed to evaluate whether, in light of actual customer 
attrition rates, the asset's life should have been adjusted. 
  
·          The Firm failed to perform, or failed to include in the work papers evidence that it 
performed, sufficient analysis to assess the appropriateness of the client's classification of 
a divested business as a discontinued operation. In connection with the divestiture, the 
client entered into certain agreements with the acquirer which called into question 
whether the operations and cash flows of the divested business would be eliminated from 
the ongoing operations of the client, and thus whether presentation of the divested 
business as a discontinued operation was appropriate. 
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ANECDOTES & STATISTICS – ENHANCED CONDITION 
 
This condition is a combination of the Anecdotes Only (PCAOB-L) and the Statistics 
Only conditions. Participants were provided with inspection reports containing anecdotal 
deficiencies as provided in the Anecdotes Only (PCAOB-L) condition along with the 
statistical information provided in the Statistics Only condition.  
The reports were counterbalanced to ensure no order effects.
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FPARB Release Number 194-2008-020 
Inspection of Audit Firm ABC   
2008 
 
A. Review of Audit Engagements 
 
The scope of the inspection procedures performed included reviews of aspects of selected 
audits of financial statements and of internal control over financial reporting performed 
by Firm ABC on two clients. In reviewing the audits, the inspection team identified a 
total of three matters across two clients that it considered to be audit deficiencies. The 
deficiencies identified were of such significance that it appeared to the inspection team 
that Firm ABC, at the time it issued its audit report, had not obtained sufficient competent 
evidential matter to support its opinion on the client's financial statements. The 
deficiencies that reached this degree of significance are described below. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ACROSS ALL CLIENTS INSPECTED 
 
Total Number of Clients Inspected: 2 
 
 
Total Number of Clients Where Deficiencies Were Found: 2 
 
 
Total Number of Deficiencies Found: 3 
 
 
Average Number of Deficiencies Per Client Inspected: 1.5 
 
 
Ratio (%) of Clients With Deficiencies To All Clients Inspected: 2/2 (100%) 
 
 
Ratio (%) of Clients Without Deficiencies To All Clients Inspected:   0/2 (0%) 
 
 
 
Results by Client Inspected For Audit Firm ABC: 
 
Client 
Inspected 
Deficiencies 
Found Client-Specific Description of Deficiency Found 
 
  Client A 1 1. The Firm failed to perform sufficient procedures with respect to 
using the findings of a specialist hired by the client to determine 
the fair value assigned to acquired in-process research and 
development. There was no evidence in the audit documentation, 
and no persuasive other evidence, that the Firm had obtained an 
understanding of certain critical methods and assumptions that the 
specialist used, or that it had performed tests of certain critical data 
provided to the specialist. 
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 Results by Client Inspected For Firm ABC Continued: 
 
Client 
Inspected 
Deficiencies 
Found Client-Specific Description of Deficiency Found 
   
 Client B 2 1. When testing inventory, the Firm relied on the client's inventory 
cycle count process without appropriately evaluating the design of 
the cycle count controls or testing the cycle count procedures. For 
example, the Firm failed to test the client's cycle count process to 
evaluate whether all inventory items were subject to cycle 
counting and whether the reports that were used in the process 
were complete and accurate. In addition, the Firm observed and 
concurrently tested only a single cycle count, although the Firm 
relied on this control to function effectively throughout the year. 
 2. The client had a note receivable from a shareholder that was 
secured by the shareholder's ownership interest in the client. The 
client considered the collection of the note to be uncertain and 
determined that the value of the note receivable should be based 
on the value of the shareholder's ownership interest in the client. 
The Firm, however, failed to obtain information to corroborate 
management's representations by, for example, making inquiries 
of the client's lawyers. 
 
 
 
80 
 
FPARB Release Number 197-2008-036 
Inspection of Audit Firm XYZ   
2008 
 
A. Review of Audit Engagements 
 
The scope of the inspection procedures performed included reviews of aspects of selected 
audits of financial statements and of internal control over financial reporting performed 
by Firm XYZ on twelve clients. In reviewing the audits, the inspection team identified a 
total of six matters across four clients that it considered to be audit deficiencies. The 
deficiencies identified were of such significance that it appeared to the inspection team 
that Firm XYZ, at the time it issued its audit report, had not obtained sufficient competent 
evidential matter to support its opinion on the client's financial statements. The 
deficiencies that reached this degree of significance are described below. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ACROSS ALL CLIENTS INSPECTED 
 
Total Number of Clients Inspected: 12 
 
 
Total Number of Clients Where Deficiencies Were Found: 4 
 
 
Total Number of Deficiencies Found: 6 
 
 
Average Number of Deficiencies Per Client Inspected: 0.5 
 
 
Ratio (%) of Clients With Deficiencies To All Clients Inspected: 4/12 (33%) 
 
 
Ratio (%) of Clients Without Deficiencies To All Clients Inspected: 8/12 (67%) 
 
 
Results by Client Inspected For Audit Firm XYZ: 
 
Client 
Inspected 
Deficiencies 
Found Client-Specific Description of Deficiency Found 
   Client A 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client B 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client C 1 1. The client held investments in certain illiquid securities. The 
Firm failed to perform sufficient procedures to evaluate the 
client's valuation of these securities. While the Firm obtained an 
understanding of the process the client had used to obtain 
information regarding the fair value of the securities and 
performed other audit procedures, the Firm failed to evaluate the 
reasonableness of certain of the assumptions related to the 
underlying information used to develop and support the estimated 
fair values. 
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Results by Client Inspected For Audit Firm XYZ Continued: 
 
 
Client 
Inspected 
Deficiencies 
Found Client-Specific Description of Deficiency Found 
Client D 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client E 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client F 2 1. When testing inventory, the Firm applied a controls reliance 
strategy, which included reliance on IT controls. The Firm's work 
papers indicated that the results of its tests of the client's 
information technology general controls did not support a 
conclusion that the client's information processing was reliable. 
The Firm, however, did not perform any additional procedures to 
address its finding, nor did it modify its audit strategy. 
    
    
2. The Firm tested minimum rental income primarily through the 
use of analytical procedures that did not meet the requirements 
for substantive analytical procedures, as the Firm did not set an 
expectation that was precise enough to provide the desired level 
of assurance that differences that may be potential material 
misstatements, individually or when aggregated, would be 
identified for investigation. 
    
Client G 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client H 1 1.  The Firm did not perform sufficient audit procedures to test 
the allowance for loan losses. The Firm's procedures for certain 
loans were limited to recalculating and comparing reserve factors 
from the current year to prior years and obtaining explanations 
from the client for changes. With respect to other loans, the 
Firm's procedures were limited to recalculating the factors. 
    
Client I 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client J 0 No Deficiencies Found 
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Results by Client Inspected For Audit Firm XYZ Continued: 
 
 
Client 
Inspected 
Deficiencies 
Found Client-Specific Description of Deficiency Found 
Client K 2 1. There was no evidence in the audit documentation, and no 
persuasive other evidence, that the Firm had evaluated whether 
the client's use of the straight-line method of amortization for 
acquired customer-related intangible assets reflected the pattern 
in which the economic benefits of the intangible asset were being 
consumed or otherwise used up. In addition, the Firm failed to 
evaluate whether, in light of actual customer attrition rates, the 
asset's life should have been adjusted. 
 
    
    
2. The Firm failed to perform, or failed to include in the work 
papers evidence that it performed, sufficient analysis to assess the 
appropriateness of the client's classification of a divested business 
as a discontinued operation. In connection with the divestiture, 
the client entered into certain agreements with the acquirer which 
called into question whether the operations and cash flows of the 
divested business would be eliminated from the ongoing 
operations of the client, and thus whether presentation of the 
divested business as a discontinued operation was appropriate. 
Client L 0 No Deficiencies Found 
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ANECDOTES & STATISTICS – JUDGMENT ORIENTATION CONDITION 
 
This condition provided reports containing the same anecdotal and statistical information 
as in the Anecdotes & Statistics–Enhanced condition. However, each report began with a 
statistical judgment orientation in order to further focus attention on the statistical data.  
The reports were counterbalanced to ensure no order effects.
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FPARB Release Number 194-2008-020 
Inspection of Audit Firm ABC   
2008 
 
The following FPARB inspection report provides an overview of the inspection teams’ 
audit of Firm ABC. The first part of the report provides a statistical summary of the 
results, including data on the scope (i.e., the number of clients the inspection team 
audited) and the frequency with which deficiencies were found. The second part of the 
report provides a more detailed description of each deficiency that the inspection team 
encountered.  
  
The FPARB inspection process involves selecting a sample of Firm ABC’s audit clients 
and then reviewing the conduct of each of those audits. The number of clients sampled, 
however, is left to the discretion of each FPARB inspection team and tends to vary 
widely between firms and is not necessarily related to firm size or historical reputation 
for audit quality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Review of Audit Engagements 
 
The scope of the inspection procedures performed included reviews of aspects of selected 
audits of financial statements and of internal control over financial reporting performed 
by Firm ABC on two clients. In reviewing the audits, the inspection team identified a 
total of three matters across two clients that it considered to be audit deficiencies. The 
deficiencies identified were of such significance that it appeared to the inspection team 
that Firm ABC, at the time it issued its audit report, had not obtained sufficient competent 
evidential matter to support its opinion on the client's financial statements. The 
deficiencies that reached this degree of significance are described below. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ACROSS ALL CLIENTS INSPECTED 
 
Total Number of Clients Inspected: 2 
 
 
Total Number of Clients Where Deficiencies Were Found: 2 
 
 
Total Number of Deficiencies Found: 3 
 
 
Average Number of Deficiencies Per Client Inspected: 1.5 
 
 
Ratio (%) of Clients With Deficiencies To All Clients Inspected: 2/2 (100%) 
 
 
Ratio (%) of Clients Without Deficiencies To All Clients Inspected:   0/2 (0%) 
 
FPARB  
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The FPARB cautions the users of these reports to take care not to overweight the 
sheer number of deficiencies reported without appropriately considering the number 
of clients inspected. 
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Results by Client Inspected For Firm ABC: 
 
Client 
Inspected 
Deficiencies 
Found Client-Specific Description of Deficiency Found 
 
  Client A 1 1. The Firm failed to perform sufficient procedures with respect to 
using the findings of a specialist hired by the client to determine the 
fair value assigned to acquired in-process research and development. 
There was no evidence in the audit documentation, and no persuasive 
other evidence, that the Firm had obtained an understanding of 
certain critical methods and assumptions that the specialist used, or 
that it had performed tests of certain critical data provided to the 
specialist. 
 
  
Client B 2 1. When testing inventory, the Firm relied on the client's inventory 
cycle count process without appropriately evaluating the design of 
the cycle count controls or testing the cycle count procedures. For 
example, the Firm failed to test the client's cycle count process to 
evaluate whether all inventory items were subject to cycle counting 
and whether the reports that were used in the process were complete 
and accurate. In addition, the Firm observed and concurrently tested 
only a single cycle count, although the Firm relied on this control to 
function effectively throughout the year. 
 
  
  
2. The client had a note receivable from a shareholder that was 
secured by the shareholder's ownership interest in the client. The 
client considered the collection of the note to be uncertain and 
determined that the value of the note receivable should be based on 
the value of the shareholder's ownership interest in the client. The 
Firm, however, failed to obtain information to corroborate 
management's representations by, for example, making inquiries of 
the client's lawyers. 
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FPARB Release Number 197-2008-036 
Inspection of Audit Firm XYZ   
2008 
 
The following FPARB inspection report provides an overview of the inspection teams’ 
audit of Firm XYZ. The first part of the report provides a statistical summary of the 
results, including data on the scope (i.e., the number of clients the inspection team 
audited) and the frequency with which deficiencies were found. The second part of the 
report provides a more detailed description of each deficiency that the inspection team 
encountered. 
  
The FPARB inspection process involves selecting a sample of Firm XYZ’s audit clients 
and then reviewing the conduct of each of those audits. The number of clients sampled, 
however, is left to the discretion of each FPARB inspection team and tends to vary 
widely between firms and is not necessarily related to firm size or historical reputation 
for audit quality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Review of Audit Engagements 
 
The scope of the inspection procedures performed included reviews of aspects of selected 
audits of financial statements and of internal control over financial reporting performed 
by Firm XYZ on twelve clients. In reviewing the audits, the inspection team identified a 
total of six matters across four clients that it considered to be audit deficiencies. The 
deficiencies identified were of such significance that it appeared to the inspection team 
that Firm XYZ, at the time it issued its audit report, had not obtained sufficient competent 
evidential matter to support its opinion on the client's financial statements. The 
deficiencies that reached this degree of significance are described below. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ACROSS ALL CLIENTS INSPECTED 
 
Total Number of Clients Inspected: 12 
 
 
Total Number of Clients Where Deficiencies Were Found: 4 
 
 
Total Number of Deficiencies Found: 6 
 
 
Average Number of Deficiencies Per Client Inspected: 0.5 
 
 
Ratio (%) of Clients With Deficiencies To All Clients Inspected: 4/12 (33%) 
 
 
Ratio (%) of Clients Without Deficiencies To All Clients Inspected: 8/12 (67%) 
 
FPARB  
Federal Public Auditor Regulatory Board 
The FPARB cautions the users of these reports to take care not to overweight the 
sheer number of deficiencies reported without appropriately considering the number 
of clients inspected. 
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Results by Client Inspected For Firm XYZ: 
 
Client 
Inspected 
Deficiencies 
Found Client-Specific Description of Deficiency Found 
   Client A 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client B 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client C 1 1. The client held investments in certain illiquid securities. The 
Firm failed to perform sufficient procedures to evaluate the client's 
valuation of these securities. While the Firm obtained an 
understanding of the process the client had used to obtain 
information regarding the fair value of the securities and 
performed other audit procedures, the Firm failed to evaluate the 
reasonableness of certain of the assumptions related to the 
underlying information used to develop and support the estimated 
fair values. 
  
Client D 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client E 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client F 2 1. When testing inventory, the Firm applied a controls reliance 
strategy, which included reliance on IT controls. The Firm's work 
papers indicated that the results of its tests of the client's 
information technology general controls did not support a 
conclusion that the client's information processing was reliable. 
The Firm, however, did not perform any additional procedures to 
address its finding, nor did it modify its audit strategy. 
 
    
    
2. The Firm tested minimum rental income primarily through the 
use of analytical procedures that did not meet the requirements for 
substantive analytical procedures, as the Firm did not set an 
expectation that was precise enough to provide the desired level of 
assurance that differences that may be potential material 
misstatements, individually or when aggregated, would be 
identified for investigation. 
Client G 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client H 1 1.  The Firm did not perform sufficient audit procedures to test the 
allowance for loan losses. The Firm's procedures for certain loans 
were limited to recalculating and comparing reserve factors from 
the current year to prior years and obtaining explanations from the 
client for changes. With respect to other loans, the Firm's 
procedures were limited to recalculating the factors. 
    
Client I 0 No Deficiencies Found 
Client J 0 No Deficiencies Found 
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Results by Client Inspected For Firm XYZ Continued: 
 
Client 
Inspected 
Deficiencies 
Found Client-Specific Description of Deficiency Found 
Client K 2 1. There was no evidence in the audit documentation, and no 
persuasive other evidence, that the Firm had evaluated whether the 
client's use of the straight-line method of amortization for acquired 
customer-related intangible assets reflected the pattern in which 
the economic benefits of the intangible asset were being consumed 
or otherwise used up. In addition, the Firm failed to evaluate 
whether, in light of actual customer attrition rates, the asset's life 
should have been adjusted. 
 
  
  
2. The Firm failed to perform, or failed to include in the work 
papers evidence that it performed, sufficient analysis to assess the 
appropriateness of the client's classification of a divested business 
as a discontinued operation. In connection with the divestiture, the 
client entered into certain agreements with the acquirer which 
called into question whether the operations and cash flows of the 
divested business would be eliminated from the ongoing 
operations of the client, and thus whether presentation of the 
divested business as a discontinued operation was appropriate. 
Client L 0 No Deficiencies Found 
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
 
The first question captured my decision variable representing the participant’s choice of 
firm (i.e., dependent variable) along with their strength of preference.   
 
The second and third questions were supplemental and asked to assess the participant’s 
global impression of the audit profession and the industry’s regulatory oversight today. 
 
The remaining questions collected demographic information.
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1.  Given all the information you've reviewed, which audit firm would you choose to 
perform Jefferson Circuit Assembly’s audit next year?   
 
(Please indicate your preference by selecting the number on the scale below that best 
represents your judgment. The closer you respond to the endpoints, the stronger your 
preference for that firm) 
    
 
 
 
Strongly 
Prefer Firm 
ABC 
Moderately 
Prefer Firm 
ABC 
Slightly 
Prefer Firm 
ABC 
Slightly 
Prefer Firm 
XYZ 
Moderately 
Prefer Firm 
XYZ 
Strongly 
Prefer Firm 
XYZ 
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2.  Please indicate on the scale below how credible you believe the audit profession is 
today.  
 
 (Please indicate your choice by selecting a point on the scale below that best represents 
your judgment. The closer you respond to the endpoints, the stronger your preference for 
that statement) 
 
Not Very Credible 
 
Very Credible 
 
       
 
 
3.  Given the oversight initiated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, please indicate on 
the scale below how effective you believe the regulatory oversight has been at 
uncovering and/or preventing audit failures in the last five years.  
 
 (Please indicate your choice by selecting a point on the scale below that best represents 
your judgment. The closer you respond to the endpoints, the stronger your preference for 
that statement) 
 
 
Very Ineffective 
 
Very Effective 
 
       
 
 
Please provide the following information: 
 
 
Total Years of Business Experience: __________ 
 
Total Years of Managerial or Supervisory Experience:________ 
 
Present job title: _______________________ 
 
Age: __________ 
 
Please indicate your gender: 
Male       Female 
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